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THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

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SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA**

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Introduction

The strategic position of Central Asia once again turns it into the most important geopolitical subject of world politics and forces it to be dependent on the interests of regional and world powers, on the geopolitical plans of the forces of international terrorism. Therefore, many are interested in plunging Central Asia into chaos and turning it into a zone of permanent escalation of conflict situations like Muslim North Africa, the Near and Middle East. Thus, turning Central Asia into a turbulent zone, dependent on global and regional geopolitical processes. To this end, the tactical doctrine of “controlled chaos”, implemented in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and other countries of the Muslim East, was launched and gradually promoted, as a result of which they de facto lost their statehood and turned into a bargaining chip of world powers.

In these conditions, to ensure the national security of Central Asian states, questions arise of joint construction of a multilateral and multilevel system of regional security, requiring urgent resolution of the tasks of mutual understanding and multilateral cooperation of the countries of the region. Undoubtedly, the security problems in Central Asia are complex geopolitical, economic, social and religious. Its complexity lies in the multidimensional and multilevel influence of both internal and external factors on the situation in the region. Its complexity also lies in the fact that, despite its shared historical past, Central Asia at the beginning of the 21st century is still not able to declare itself as a single and united new force in world politics. Under such conditions, the prospect of religious radicalization and violent extremism is considered one of the main security threats to Central Asian countries.

Moreover, the main problem and impending danger is that even a local escalation of religious violence in one of the Central Asian countries can result in a large-scale armed conflict at the regional level. Moreover, there are more than enough prerequisites for destabilizing and escalating the religious, and not only religious situation in the region. As many understand the most important reasons for the growth of religious extremism in Central Asia are a set of socio-economic, socio-political and ideological problems of an internal and external nature that affect the security of all countries in the region.

In this regard, an extremely difficult situation is developing in the Ferghana Valley, which is divided between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. As many know, the territory of the Ferghana Valley is less than 5% of the entire region, but there is a very high population density. If in general in Central Asia this indicator is 28.8 people per square kilometer, then in the Ferghana Valley - 1150 people. In addition, there is a difficult ethno-political situation, a low standard of living, and the position of Islamic radicalism is especially strong. [one]

In general, in the event of a local, and then a possible regional conflict of a religious or ethno-religious nature and a likely coordinated invasion of international extremists within Central Asia, the region will plunge into chaos for a long time, and become the ruins of a cultural, intellectual, material and political past well-being, like Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Syria, etc. Thus, become the next victims of geo-political projects of global actors and jihadist ideas of religious extremists. Therefore, in the conditions of the rapid growth of various destabilizing factors, it is first of all necessary to coordinate and optimize the religious policy of the countries of the region with the help of joint political, legal, socio-economic, spiritual-educational, law-enforcement and preventive projects and power factors, i.e. systematic approaches to solving emerging problems in Central Asia.

No doubt, given the difficult state of religious situation in Central Asia, the urgent need for an optimal and coordinated religious policy of the countries of the region should be recognized. The current situation, especially the undesirable and uncontrollable trends in the development of religious processes in the region, require a systematic, joint and purposeful religious policy of the Central Asian countries. For, against the unified position of internal and external religious radicalism, a coordinated and adequate religious policy of the Central Asian states should be pursued. Moreover, the situation and problems in this complex matter are practically the same for all states. Therefore, the ways and methods of solving them should be similar. In this regard, the question is rightly raised, what is the religious situation in the countries of Central Asia, what is the state immunity of the countries of the region, what problems await them and what are the ways out of this situation?

Of course, today Islam and Muslim organizations occupy an important place in the social matrix of all countries in the region and the nature of their relationship with the state allows us to judge a lot. For example, on the actual implementation of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens associated with Islam, on the level of Islamization of society, on the degree of religious beliefs of people, on

religious culture and education of people, on the attitude of the state towards religion and religious organizations.

Turning to state-confessional relations in the countries of Central Asia, it should be noted that although the region is often considered as a single whole, ethno-linguistic, cultural, economic, mental and confessional relations in the region have serious differences and specificity in many aspects. For example, on the political, legal and socio-economic approaches of the states of the region in resolving religious issues, on the religious activity of people, the level of religiosity of the population, and the religious education of believers. In particular, under formally identical regulatory conditions, many issues related to religious problems in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are addressed differently. In some states, when solving complex and delicate issues of religion, simple but repressive-coercive approaches prevail, while in others they are complex liberal-democratic ones. Therefore, through the prism of political and legal aspects, it would be incorrect to put them on the same level. Accordingly, many of the results of the implementation of regulatory acts defining the religious situation in the countries of the region are characterized in different ways. Of course, these conflicts and contrasts de jure are not reflected clearly in the legislation of the countries of Central Asia.

In general, although more than a quarter of a century has already passed since the Soviet regime had sunk into oblivion and in many areas of the Central Asian states radical changes took place, the religious policies of the states of the region, the legal status of believers and religious organizations remained stagnant and still far from those formal provisions enshrined in the Constitutions of the countries of the region. Moreover, the constitutional conditions are often amended, misleading by other bylaws, which are far from the full recognition of the rights of believers. Therefore, the conservatism and inertia of state thinking, based on these regulatory legal acts, the repressive policies of the state of the region are often explained by the alarming threats of international terrorism and religious extremism. Although, as practice shows, by unsuccessful legislation and inadequate hard practice, the state authorities of the region sometimes themselves contribute to exacerbating the protest mood among believers, pushing them to radical steps. Due to the imperfection of normative legal acts and political and ideological dogmatism, the governments of the region have faced the difficulty of defining a model of secular boundaries, the place of religion in society and the state, and determining the optimal trajectory of the process of Islamization and control, taking into account new challenges.

Thus, the countries of the region remain at a low political and legal level, when believers and religious organizations are considered at least as ambivalent, asocial phenomena, at most as destructive, potentially dangerous forces that need to be controlled and limited in their activities. Therefore, a more civilized approach in the relationship between the states of the region and religious circles, when the state and religious organizations reckoning with each other, respecting each other and mutually supporting each other will constructively solve the common problems of the states of the region, are postponed.

In general, political and legal, socio-economic, mental and religious factors in the countries of Central Asia develop in different ways. Many and most important issues of Islamization of the countries of the region are also solved in different ways. Undoubtedly, in this complex and delicate matter there are obvious achievements and undeniable omissions of the countries of the region. Therefore, under the urgent need to create an effective regional security system for Central Asia, it is they who act as positive and negative factors.

Religious situation in post-soviet Central Asia

The acquisition of independence by the Central Asian states created favorable conditions for a radical change in the religious situation in the region. As a result of this, in recent years, the religious situation in Central Asia has changed dramatically. Here, more relief contours of the new Muslim region are formed with their own characteristics and problems. Although, it cannot be said that the process of Islamization in the countries of the region has largely completed and received its clearly completed form.

Despite the fact that the countries of Central Asia in the historical past jointly created different forms of statehood and for a long time

were part of tsarist Russia, and then the Soviet Union, have a similar culture, language, traditions and mentality, and mainly profess Islam of the Sunni madhhab, the process Islamization in the countries of the region comes with

various achievements, characteristics, different rates, sometimes omissions and undesirable excesses. This complex and multifaceted process, its dynamics and orientation are determined by various factors lying on different planes. Consequently, the process of Islamization in the countries of Central Asia has different rates and trends, characteristic features and communities, positive and negative sides that in the future may become the causes of various situations in countries of the region with 70 million people. In this sense, much depends on the pace, scale, characteristic and substantial aspects of the Islamization of the countries of the region.

According to the official data shown in the following table, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan occupy the first three places according to the general religiosity of the population of Central Asian countries. However, among the originally Muslim indigenous peoples of the region, Islamization has a high share among the Uzbeks in Uzbekistan, Tajiks in Tajikistan and Turkmens in Turkmenistan.

Central Asia in the historical past jointly created different forms of statehood and for a long time were part of tsarist Russia,

Religiosity and Islamization of Central Asian countries

Country	Religiosity	Muslims	Christians	Atheists	Others
Uzbekistan	51%	96.8%	2,4%	0,8	-
Tajikistan	85%	96.8%	1,7%	1,5%	-
Turkmenistan	80%	93.0%	6,5%	0,5%	-
Kyrgyzstan	72%	88.0%	11,5%	0,4%	0,3%
Kazakhstan	64%	70.4%	24,8%	4,2%	0,1%

This is explained by the fact that the indigenous representatives of these countries, being sedentary people, had deeper and richer Islamic traditions than nomadic Kyrgyz and Kazakhs. For this reason, the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs have preserved many elements of pre-Islamic

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folk beliefs. For example, Tengrianism, whose Kyrgyz representatives are still seeking to recognize this movement as a separate religious movement through the courts. On the other hand, for well-known reasons, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were more Europeanized in Tsarist-Russian and Soviet times. Because of this, a relatively high proportion of adherents of non-Islamic religions, atheists and proselytes remain in these countries. Moreover, their ranks are increasing. For example, if according to the data given in the table earlier, atheists in Kazakhstan amounted to 4.2%, then according to KISI in 2019, the share of non-believers in Kazakhstan amounted to 18.8% of the total population of the republic. [2]

It should be noted that according to the results of many studies, according to authoritative opinions of scientists and experts, the quantitative growth and boom of Islamization is not always accompanied by a qualitative, substantial component. For example, according to experts, 40% of Central Asian Muslims are formal Muslims. [3] In Kazakhstan, only 7-11% of Muslims perform all Muslim rituals and are true Muslims. [4] As the results of the research project "Islam and Religion in Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan" (2017) show, only 32.7% of Kyrgyz Muslims perform daily prayers, 47.9% do not perform at all, and the remaining 19.5% do from time to time. Only 50% of Kyrgyz Muslims hold fast, 29.9% do not hold, 28.4% attend a mosque at least once a week. [5]

As it is known, the Kyrgyz people traditionally differed in relatively weak Islamization. Therefore, many scientists and travelers in past centuries even doubted their Islam. In addition, Kyrgyz Muslims have traditionally been extremely syncretic. At the same time, elements of pre-Islamic beliefs occupied a significant share in Kyrgyz

Islam. Especially Tengrianism. Therefore, the radical Islamization of the Kyrgyz people and the absolutely high quantitative results in this process raise certain questions and doubts about the artificiality of the forced Muslims of the Kyrgyz.

Of course, the mass character, scope, scale and pace of Islamization of the people of Central Asian countries is an unconditional regularity after a long militant atheism of the Communists, and this is mainly positive. These phenomena are not directly related to the radicalization of Muslims in the region. This is a natural revival of religions and religious life after the Soviet period. So far, in terms of religious security, all Central Asian countries are in a more or less prosperous states. However, due to socio-economic problems, the lack of clear and strong ideological prospects, the dominance of political corruption, the lack of social justice, and under the pressure of the active ideological and propaganda influence of the external forces of religious extremism, there is a gradual increase in dissatisfaction in society with religious colors.

Therefore, in the public mind and in the views of the authorities, as well as in the conclusions of experts, the Islamic Renaissance in Central Asian countries is sometimes associated with Islamic radicalism. As, in this rapid and dizzying process, there are dubious, even undesirable trends. Due to this, recently the question has been sharply raised about the need to rationally and effectively manage this process, to direct it in a rational and positive direction in accordance with the interests of the state and considering the values of the positive-traditional and local Islam. For many, especially young people, on the waves of religious romanticism instantly became Muslims, without firm convictions and clear ideas about traditional Sunni Islam, are victims of various pseudo-Islamic, including extremist, movements.

In connection with the large-scale and accelerated spread of religiosity among the populations of the countries of Central Asia, the number of various faiths and religious organizations of Muslims began to increase rapidly. Moreover, as the following table shows, several trends are observed in this matter.

The Islamic Renaissance in Central Asian countries is sometimes associated with Islamic radicalism.

Religious Organizations and Faiths in the Countries of Central Asia

Country	Confessions	Religious organizations		Islamic org-ns in %	Islamic org-ns per Muslim
		Total	Islamic org-ns		
Tajikistan	6	3882	3797	97.8%	233
Uzbekistan	16	2223	2042	92%	14931
Kyrgyzstan	More than 30	3319	2910	92.68%	1904
Turkmenistan	4	130	106	81.5%	49286
Kazakhstan	17	4200	2229	53.07%	5877

Firstly, in the total number of religious organizations and the number of Muslim religious organizations among the countries of the region, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hold the palm. Of course, if one looks at these figures, considering the number of organizations per capita in the region, there will be a different picture. The leadership of Kyrgyzstan is undoubtedly. Secondly, all of the religious organizations in the countries of Central Asia, the majority are Islamic. Especially in Tajikistan (97.8%), Uzbekistan (92%) and Kyrgyzstan (82.68%). Thirdly, in terms of the number of Muslim organizations in the number of Muslims in the region, a rather high place is occupied by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where 233 (Tajikistan) and 1904 (Kyrgyzstan) Muslims each have one Islamic organization. As world practice shows, in the developed countries of the world, one religious organization corresponds to 3000 and 3500 per capita. (Int. Conf. Speaker. Taj.) [6]

Fourth, in some countries of Central Asia, streamlining and artificial reduction have been observed in recent years, while in others has been an active increase in the number of religious organizations. For example, in Kazakhstan, after re-registration, the number of religious organizations decreased by 32%. That is, of the 4551 religious organizations that existed on 01.01.2011, representing 46 faiths and

В-четвертых, в отдельных странах Центральной Азии в последние годы наблюдается упорядочение и искусственное сокращение,

denominations, 3088 organizations representing 17 faiths remained. [7] On the contrary, in Kyrgyzstan the number of religious organizations is constantly and systematically growing. Especially in

recent years. Therefore, in Kyrgyzstan over the past five years (2014-2019), the number of religious organizations has grown to 3,319. In 2014, there were 2,600. That is, over five years the number of religious organizations has increased by 719. [8]

One of the peculiarities of Kyrgyzstan is that 68 Muslim centers, foundations, NGOs, associations engaged in educational, enlightenment, commercial, charitable activities and the construction of places of worship were registered and are active there. Due to

the liberal policy of Kyrgyzstan, the activities of various faiths have gained a particular scope, and at present more than 30 religious denominations function in the country.

Among them

1. Sunni Islam;
2. Orthodox Christianity (Russian Orthodox Church);
3. Temple of the Protection of the Mother of God (supporters of the old Orthodoxy);
4. Evangelical Church of Christian Baptists;
5. Seventh-day Adventist Christians;
6. Pentecostal Christians (represented in two branches: “The Union of Churches of Christians of the Evangelical Faith and the religious association “Kudai Jamaat”);
7. Evangelical Lutheran community;
8. Evangelical Christian churches;
9. Evangelical Christian Presbyterian Church;
10. Religious Center «Jehovah’s Witnesses»; -
11. The Christian Church of the Full Gospel (“Song of God”);
12. Christians of the New Apostles (community);
13. The local church of Jesus Christ;
14. The Union of Churches of Christians of the Evangelical Faith;
15. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints;
16. Lutherans;
17. Church of Scientology;
18. Lutheran church «Concordia»;
19. The Bahai community;
20. Catholic communities;
21. Protestant communities;
22. Buddhist community;
23. The Jewish community;
24. The Beat Yeshua Messianic Jewish Community;
25. Community of the Russian Orthodox Church (not related to the Russian Orthodox Church);
26. Community of Old Orthodox Christian Pomeranian (Old Believers-Pomeranians, not related to the Russian Orthodox Church);
27. Protestant non-denominated religious organizations (represented by 13 churches);
28. Universal Church (whose activities are currently suspended);
29. Ahmadian society of Muslims, etc.

Moreover, in addition to the above officially registered denominations, a number of religious movements are illegally operating in the country. The illegality of their actions was determined by the judicial authorities of Kyrgyzstan, the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan and the power structures of the republic.

Among them

1. Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami (“Islamic Party of Liberation”, appeared in Kyrgyzstan in the mid 90’s of XX century);
2. The Akromiya group (split from the Hizb ut-Tahrir party in 1997);
3. The Hizb en Nusra Group (Victory Party, split from the Hizb ut-Tahrir Party in 1999);
4. Wahhabis (Orthodox Muslims);
5. Falun Gong;
6. The Church of the Association of Saint Men Moon;
7. The White Brotherhood;
8. Blue lotus;
9. Satanism;
10. The teachings of the cult of Sri Chinmoy;
11. International Society for Krishna Consciousness;
12. Maharishi School of Management.

Compared to Kyrgyzstan, in the larger states of the region the number of denominations is much smaller, not to mention Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where their number is the smallest. Of course, multi-confessionality is a natural phenomenon for multi-national states. However, excessive liberalism and unlimited multi-confessionality are fraught with undesirable consequences in the future. Each time, non-healing wounds of the Middle East “Lebanization” remind of this. This is evidenced by the increasingly occurring cases of “jamaatization” of Muslims and conflict situations between representatives of various faiths in Kyrgyzstan. “Jamaatization” of Kyrgyzstan’s Muslims is due to the state’s uncontrolled entry into the country of missionaries of foreign Islamic emissaries and the free exit of citizens of the country to various Islamic educational institutions of the Islamic East.

Since 1996, over 1,137 missionaries from 54 countries of the world have visited Kyrgyzstan with a missionary goal. As a result of this, an ideological struggle between supporters of various movements and movements of Islam is taking place and flaring up in Kyrgyzstan, and a difficult situation is emerging related to the intervention of

informal and non-traditional Islamic jamaats that adhere to Islam that is not traditional for the Hanafi madhhab. Such a situation raises concerns even of representatives of the states of the classical Islamic East. So, in 2018, Speaking at the II International Conference “Islam in a Modern Secular State,” Chairman of the Department of Education and Knowledge Abu Dhabi (OAE) Ali Rashid Abdullah Ali Alnuaimi, speaking to the Kyrgyz, said “do not let anyone come to Kyrgyzstan and promote their Islam.” In his speech as a council, he emphasized that “In a civilized world, we must observe peaceful coexistence. My advice to you is the first: you need to be a nation-wide state in which all citizens and non-governmental and governmental organizations actively participate, so that you begin with the education and training of love and tolerance from the first grades, so that you have a plan to fight extremism. Build your Kyrgyz Islam. I repeat once again that the rooting of national identity and loyalty is a responsibility that lies on the shoulders of the ulema of Kyrgyzstan, so that there is no state in the state, so that it is a single, integral body.”

Mosques and Imams of Central Asia

In connection with the rapid increase in the number of Muslims in the countries of the region, mosques were opened on a wide scale and everywhere, indiscriminately and urgently appointed newly-minted imams. For example, after the collapse of the USSR, 68 mosques were registered in Kazakhstan, and in Kyrgyzstan 39, in Uzbekistan 300, Turkmenistan 70 and 17 mosques in Tajikistan. As the following table shows, over the years of independence in the countries of Central Asia, mosques, and after them the imams have shown phenomenal quantitative growth.

Mosques and Imams of Central Asia. (2016)

Country	Mosques	1 mosque per a believer	Number of imams	1 imam per a believer
Tajikistan	3930	2036	3914	2210
Kyrgyzstan	2669	2251	2500	2407
Kazakhstan	2516	7071	3611	4915
Uzbekistan	2065	15423	4100	7834
Turkmenistan	398	14228		

According to these indicators, Kyrgyzstan, together with Tajikistan, were in the first positions. These two states have absolute and relative leadership in the number of mosques and imams in Central Asia. Most importantly, the ratio of the number of mosques and imams to the number of Muslims living in these countries was several times greater than in other states of the region. Of course, such a comparison is incorrect, but the number of mosques in Tajikistan exceeded the number of schools.

In fairness, it should be noted that despite such forced results, by world standards, the number of mosques in Central Asia is still not enough. For example, in 2017, 3.6 million mosques were functioning all over the world, and this meant that for every 500 Muslims there was one mosque. According to forecasts, by 2019 the number of mosques in the world will be 3.85 million. [10]

It is extremely difficult to unequivocally say about the positivity or negativity of the excessive and erratic growth in the number of mosques and imams in Central Asia. The mosque itself is the most important building and an important element of the Muslim city and village in social, political and urban planning terms. It plays an important role not only in the religious, but also in the public life of

the Muslim community, as a place of socialization. Mosques earlier, and in the current conditions, play a large social and educational role among Muslims. Many generations of scientists came out of the walls of mosques, a huge number of inquisitive and outstanding students studied and study in these mosques. In general, mosques performed and perform such social functions as a place for prayer, a place for education, libraries, meetings of the Muslim community, conversations and discussions of the various subtleties of Islam. Of course, in all this there was and is a lot of positive. However, as a result of spontaneous and forced growth in the number of mosques and imams in Central Asia, a number of mosques and imams were discredited, there were negative aspects associated with them. Due to this, positive and substantial aspects in the work of mosques and imams have been affected.

Firstly, due to the depressing state of individual mosques, inappropriate and hastily opened and inappropriate acts, and obscene behavior of individual illiterate pseudo-imams, the true values of Islam were devalued and Islam itself was discredited. In many respects, therefore, in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, as a result of re-certification, thousands of mosques were closed. For example, in Uzbekistan, the number of mosques has risen sharply from 300 in 1989 to 6 thousand in 1993. But in the following years, a thousand mosques did not pass official re-registration and were closed in 2018, following the results of re-registration.

Further developments in the closing of mosques came to the point that in 2019 in Uzbekistan, more than 10 mosques for her in the Ferghana region were closed and put up for sale through an auction under the pretext that they were illegal. [11] In 2018, as a result of re-registration, 1,938 mosques that did not meet the requirements of state power were closed in Tajikistan. [12] In 1997, more than half of the mosques operating in Turkmenistan did not pass re-certification. [13] Although, many of them continued to operate with the tacit consent of local authorities. In 2016, certification of imams was conducted in Kyrgyzstan, as a result of which 92% of imams were not even admitted to certification because of the lack of appropriate religious and secular education. [14] In 2017, 730 of 2670 imams did not pass certification. [15] In general, in 2019. The head of the fatwa department of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, Ravshan Eratov, admitted that the SAMK has no statistics on higher and secondary education of the country's imams. There is no information about the imams removed from their posts for a

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mistake in their work. Until 2014, there was no information about the convictions of imams. [16]

Secondly, due to the chaotic opening and unauthorized activities, individual mosques and imams acted without official registration and permission of state bodies, as well as without official sanctions of religious organizations of Central Asian countries. Under these conditions, the activities of individual mosques and imams, being out of sight of the religious and state leadership of the countries of the region, began to act contrary to the interests of the state, society and local traditional Islam. They have become centers

Secondly, due to the chaotic opening and unauthorized activities, individual mosques and imams acted without official registration and permission

of destructive influences and pseudo-Islamic acts, distorting the true meaning of Islam. For example, this situation has developed around the largest mosque in the south of Kyrgyzstan, the mosque “As Sarakhsi” of Kara-Suu and its imams.

Of course, virtually all Central Asian states in the struggle against the expansion of the ideas of religious radicalism rely on the local traditional clergy. However, in modern conditions, when the ideological and propaganda activities of religious extremists reach a new, high level, using modern technologies and methods of influencing believers, the intellectual level, qualifications and equipment of the spiritual leaders of Central Asian countries remain in unsatisfactory condition. On many important issues of the Muslim religion, they are incompetent and mainly engaged in the performance of religious rites and rituals. Therefore, the traditional clergy often cannot resist the ideological and worldview expansion of radical Islam. Because of this, the propaganda and recruitment of Central Asian Muslims into terrorist organizations takes place almost unhindered, beyond the influence of traditional Islam.

In this context, dubious foreign missionaries, various religious centers of foreign countries, government circles of individual countries, etc., who provided huge financial investments in the construction and organization of mosque activities, had a significant influence on the activities of mosques and their imams. For example, according to experts, in the first 10-15 years of independence of Kyrgyzstan, more than 90% of mosques were built at the expense of patrons and missionaries from abroad, and more than \$ 500 million was invested in this. [17]

Another important indicator of the religiosity of the countries of Central Asia, as well as a significant indicator of the quality and content of the process of Islamization of the states of the region

is the level of religious enlightenment, education of Muslims, the presence and structure of the national Muslim intelligentsia. From elementary enlightenment and deliverance of believers from religious ignorance, and mistakes, to the preparation of an educated national Muslim intelligentsia is an important historical mission of Islamic education. In this sense, education itself, including religious, is a positive phenomenon. However, education is different. It is necessary to clearly determine what kind of religious education is needed – high or poor-quality, constructive or destructive, state or private, and what are its programmatic and ideological goals and objectives. An important issue in religious education is that it meets the interests of the states in the region and local traditional Islam or is a latent nursery of destructive, alien, especially extremist knowledge and ideas.

In general, the complex issues of religious, theological and religious education and the issues of preparing ministers of worship and civil servants for the religious sphere and the issues of religious education in different states of the region are addressed differently. According to statistics, in formal, that is, in quantitative terms, again, Kyrgyzstan has high indicators.

Religious educational institutions of Central Asian states:

Country	Numbers	Religious institute per a believer
Kyrgyzstan	112	68,400
Kazakhstan	13	1.36 mln.
Uzbekistan	11	3.21 mln.
Tajikistan	1	8.65 mln.
Turkmenistan	0	0

Especially, in the ratio of one educational institution to the number of Muslim believers. Of course, at the same time, it should be recognized that in other states of the region in relation to religious education, strict policies are being pursued and the activities of religious educational organizations are strictly monitored and regulated. In case of violation of the requirements and conditions of the state, dubious religious educational institutions are liquidated. If post-Soviet Turkmenistan, from the very beginning, was more restrained regarding the issues of religious education, then the rest of the Central Asian states took a more liberal position. Thanks to this, in a short time there was a rapid development of religious education. However, after the first alarming symptoms of a negative nature, virtually all the states of the region, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, began to massively close religious schools and take harsh measures against religious figures. For example, in 2000, the

president of Turkmenistan closed all madrassas and religious schools in the country. Even Turkish lyceums of the Sebat organization were outlawed. [18] In 2005, the only faculty of theology in the whole country in Tajikistan was closed. In 2019, the last of the 19 madrassas of Tajikistan was closed. Here they began to close madrassas 7 years ago. Illegal religious education has been punished by imprisonment of 5 to 12 years. 2,896 people from 3,054 Tajik students in foreign countries were returned. [19]

In Kyrgyzstan, 112 religious educational institutions are registered. Including 1 university, 10 institutes and more than 100 madrassas. Although, only about 90% of them function. However, there are separate funds that are not included in the list of educational institutions, but also conduct educational activities under other signs, without having the appropriate license. In fact, all religious educational institutions in the financial, educational, organizational, and other plan are provided by unknown sources. Often due to

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overseas. At one time, being the head of the State Commission for Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Zhumabaev admitted that 90% of the madrassas existing in Kyrgyzstan receive support from abroad. [20] Despite repeated attempts by state bodies, many religious educational institutions carry out their educational work under programs not coordinated with the relevant state services. Consequently, graduates of these educational institutions do not receive state certificates and diplomas and upon graduation turn out to be unclaimed by society. If we take into account the fact that an average of 800 students study annually, then it turns out that approximately the same number of Kyrgyz citizens graduate from religious schools every year and without certificates and diplomas find themselves in an uncertain, that is, unclaimed position. It is possible that many of them become labor migrants, who make up the bulk of disenfranchised and second-rate laborers in neighboring countries. It is possible that some of them in a difficult, powerless and helpless state become easy prey for the recruiters of radical Islamic groups. How many of these will be in the future of Kyrgyzstan in 10-15-20 years, and what will happen to them? There is concern that such a situation will become a long-term and hidden form of Talibanization of the country's youth. Perhaps, to a certain extent, this alarming trend is associated with this phenomenon in Kyrgyzstan, when after 9th grade, 29% of students leave the republic's schools, and about 40% in Osh oblast. According to the legislation of Kyrgyzstan, students are accepted in madrassas only after the 9th grade. [21]

Despite the quantitative achievements of Kyrgyzstan in the field of religious education, there is clearly a lack of quality, content, socially useful demand and state regulation of religious education. The principles of reasonable sufficiency and sufficient controllability of the situation in this area are not observed in comparison with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and other states of the region. Being actually a non-state sector of religious education, these educational institutions operate with minimal public benefit, serve someone's ambitions, personal interests, and momentary benefits. And their future remains very vague and alarming.

Another distinctive feature of Kyrgyzstan in the issue of religious education is a certain positive character. In recent years, along with the non-governmental sector of religious education, the public sector has gradually developed.

For several years, theological faculties bachelor and master programs have been trained at theological departments of three largest state universities in Kyrgyzstan. The first graduation of the theological college at KSU named after I. Arabaev. Finally, in 2017, after 26 years, as a result of numerous attempts, the Islamic University of Kyrgyzstan received a state license for educational activities and began to graduate students in several undergraduate programs. In many ways, it is with them that the hope of the state and the country's Muslims for the preparation of a comprehensively educated, cultural and patriotic Muslim intelligentsia of Kyrgyzstan is connected. At the same time, it should be recognized and regretted that the state did not and does not take a direct and active part in the religious education of its citizens, without investing a single cent in this archival state business, without providing the slightest material and moral support. That is, the training of religious specialists in all state universities and the Islamic University of Kyrgyzstan is carried out not at the expense of state funds, but at the expense of Turkey, private individuals of Kyrgyzstan and various funds of other foreign countries and non-government circles abroad.

In general, as was directly and indirectly noted above, as in solving other complex issues of the religious sphere, there was no state vision of the problem. There was also no state approach to understanding the issue and state solution to the problems of religious education in the implementation of religious education.

Unlike Kyrgyzstan, religious education in Kazakhstan is carried out under the full support and constant control of the state. For example, the state provides grants and scholarships to students

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in Islamic educational institutions. In particular, in the academic year 2017-2018 alone, the state allocated 218 grants to study at Nur Mubarak University. Grants are also provided by students at college madrassas. In Kazakhstan there is a university, a center for advanced training of imams, a research center of Abu Hanifa and 10 madrassas. [22] That is, Kazakhstan in this delicate matter is guided by the principle of “less is better” and carries out this sphere of activity of Muslims under the auspices of the state.

Another trend in the religious education of Central Asian countries is the uncontrolled departure of young people to study in the countries of the Muslim East. In the academic year 2016-2017

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alone, 322 citizens of Kyrgyzstan studied at foreign educational institutions. In particular, 9 citizens of the republic studied in the religious educational centers of Pakistan, 127 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 26 in Egypt, 25 in Jordan,

24 in Russia, Kuwait-6. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the data of the 2016-2017 school year show a decrease in the flow of Kyrgyz believers who want to study in foreign religious educational institutions. For example, in 2012 their number was about 571 people, in 2013 - 604, in 2014 - 394 and in 2015 - 411 [23]

In a 2017 joint report by the Bulan Institute and the State Commission for Religious Affairs of Kyrgyzstan, it was noted that out of eight members of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, religious education was received in Pakistan -2, Egypt -2, Turkey-1, Russia-1, and only two members of the SAMK received a local religious education. Out of 21 members of the Ulama Council, four received education in Egypt, Jordan-2, Pakistan -2, Turkey-2, Libya-1, Saudi Arabia -1, Uzbekistan -2 and 7 members of the Council of Muslim Ulema of Kyrgyzstan received religious education in Kyrgyzstan. [24]

As a rule, many of the graduates of foreign educational religious organizations return with ideas, knowledge and views that are foreign to the traditional Islam of the region. Thus, various religious movements, jamaats, opposing or competing with each other, are spreading in the Muslim communities of Central Asian countries. As a result of this, the Muslim communities of Central Asian countries are also experiencing a generational conflict. Religious intolerance and radicalism are growing. Distrust and intolerance towards the state activities of secular authorities crystallize.

In general, despite the seemingly vigorous activity of Muslim educational institutions in the private sector, the growing activity of

state religious educational institutions and the systematic departure of young people to foreign religious educational institutions, their contribution to the religious education of local Muslims remains untangible. The results of R. Jalil's study "Islam and Religion in Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan" (University of Pittsburgh) 2012-2015 showed that Kyrgyz Muslims - respondents named the following sources of religious knowledge - friends and peers (30.5%), family members (25.2%), publications (12.7%), sermons of the mosque (13.9%) and religious schools (3%). Depressing layout. [25]

Hajj is an indicator of the canonical Islamization of the region

One of the important indicators of the level of religiosity of the population, the quality level and the consistency of Islam is the indicators on the number of Hajjs. Rapid Islamization, the elimination of all kinds of restrictions that existed before, the opportunity for free entry and exit from the country have become important factors in the accelerated growth in the number of pilgrims to Mecca from Central

Asia. Due to this, every year more than 20 thousand Muslims of Central Asia perform Hajj according to the provided country quotas. The Hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam and is considered the most important ritual without which Islam loses its fullness. Along with this,

the socio-ethical aspect of the Hajj plays an important role. During the pilgrimage and after the Hajj, Muslims especially try to strictly observe the ethical principles of Islam and in every way try to avoid any obscene, asocial, especially destructive acts. Studies by scientists at Harvard University have shown that the Hajj helps strengthen tolerance among Muslims, reduces radical ideas.

Hajj activates a true Muslim brotherhood and is an essential factor in the consolidation of Muslims. Pilgrims in every possible way try to observe equality and brotherhood regardless of the citizenship of a state, gender, age and social status. As a real school of Muslim ethics, the Hajj enforces such qualities of a Muslim as patience, humility, self-control, mutual assistance. Hajj educates a Muslim humanism, generosity, austerity, modesty, nobility, wisdom, pliability, honesty, mercy, etc.

The social status and social responsibility of Hajj Muslims among believers and in civil society are rising. In many cases, they become leaders, universally recognized authorities and ideologists not only in Muslim circles, but also in civil society. In general, a sign of acceptance by the Almighty Hajj is considered a change in the character of a Muslim in a positive way.

As a result, Islam for a true Hajj Muslim is exalted not only as a faith, but also as a harmonious way of life of a believer, a way to lead

One of the important indicators of the level of religiosity of the population, the quality level and the consistency of Islam is the indicators on the number of Hajjs.

a virtuous life, and mean a humane and creative life in society. In this sense, the hajj is an undeniable positive factor. It is from this perspective that I would like to consider and perceive the Hajj phenomenon in the countries of Central Asia. In this case, we can assume that Kyrgyzstan in the absolute (with the exception of Tajikistan) and relative sense has the largest positive-deterrent potential in Central Asia, in the person of hajjs. As shown in the table, for certain reasons, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have always been given more seats. As a result of this, 0.59 and 0.68% of Muslims in these two countries became Hajj.

Number of Muslims visiting Hajj in CA

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total:	% muslims visiting Hajj
Tajikistan	5000	5500	5000	6000	6300	6000	6000	6520	6300	52620	0.59
Uzbekistan	5200	5094	5000	5200	5200	670	7200	7346	7200	48110	0.16
Kyrgyzstan	4301	4000	4500	3600	3685	3685	3685	4585	5400	37441	0.68
Kazakhstan	4000	3500	5000	4400	5000	5000	3000	2500	3000	35400	0,27
Turkmenistan	188	188	188	188	188	188	160	160	153	1601	0,03

If, in the 70 years of Soviet regime, only more than 30 Tajik citizens made pilgrimages, then after independence, more than 200 thousand Muslims of the republic have been able to perform the Hajj. However, in this case, quantitative indicators are not always and not fully supported by qualitatively substantial components. Unfortunately, sometimes hajjs can become one of the powerful destructive elements and become leaders in exciting, spreading and strengthening Muslim fanaticism, radicalism and extremism.

The meaningfulness of the Hajj, its religious and social usefulness, positive moral and ethical value or its negatively destructive effect for Muslim society and the state, is largely related to the selection of candidates. In cases where a candidate has been approved by the local Muslim community, including the upper echelons and relevant state bodies, the Muslim jamaat and civil society have received true Hajjs. In other cases, the true meaning of the hajj was distorted. For example, in previous years in Kyrgyzstan, the process of pilgrimage of Muslims in the country was accompanied by bribery, intrigue and litigation in connection with the sale of vacant seats to merchants, deputies and ministers, as well as dubious citizens of Kyrgyzstan and other states. As a result, certain high-ranking political officials and businessmen who are far from true Islam, having performed, even more than once, the Hajj upon return, began to continue the old unseemly things that did not even correspond to the average Muslim. Thus, they have contributed a lot to discredit and devalue the Hajj phenomenon in society.

**The meaningfulness of the Hajj, its religious
and social usefulness, positive moral and
ethical value**

Thus, after the collapse of the USSR, the religious situation in Central Asia changed

Thus, after the collapse of the USSR, the religious situation in Central Asia changed dramatically. In the first years of the re-Islamization of the region, loyalty was observed in the religious policy of the states of the region and widespread liberalization in the field of religious law and relations. As a result, the scale and pace of Islamization was accompanied by a rapid increase in the number of adherents of Islam, mosques, imams, religious schools, hajjs and other formal indicators of Islam.

In the initial stage of the re-Islamization of the region, Islam also responded with reciprocity and loyalty. Tolerance, lack of socio-political activity were a characteristic features of the Islamization process of this period. At that time, Islam remained rather a spiritual, cultural, moral and ethical, religious-enlightening and only to a certain extent social phenomenon. However, firstly, under the influence of the escalation of global pseudo-Islamic extremism and terrorism, and secondly, under the influence of a permanent socio-economic and spiritual crisis, ideological and political uncertainty and instability in the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia, Islam began to show socio-political activity, expressing and defending the aspirations of the marginalized Muslims. Therefore, a certain part of the crisis society began to provide confidence and seek support, protection from Islam. For example, according to the results of a sociological study by the Pew Research Center “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society”, 2% of Muslims in Kazakhstan assume that attacks on citizens to protect Islam can often/sometimes be justified, in Kyrgyzstan - 10%, Afghanistan - 39%. Another indicator: 10% of Muslims in Kazakhstan would like Sharia to become an official law in the state, in Kyrgyzstan - 35%, in Afghanistan - 99%). [26]

On the other hand, Islam has become more politicized, adopting and developing alien ideologies, methodically moving on to anti-state protest actions. In some places in Central Asia, signs of radicalism of certain Muslim circles began to appear. Soon, in virtually all countries of the region with the exception of Turkmenistan, terrorist attempts by extremists took place.

On the whole, the state policy of non-interference and ignoring, connivance and flirting, as well as incorrectly and untimely placed accents of the authorities in some cases, overly harsh and unjustifiably repressive measures in other cases gradually led to the radicalization of a certain part of the Central Asian states. Along with this, the acute situation in the crisis societies of the countries of the region themselves played a no less important role in the radicalization of

Muslims in Central Asia. It was associated with socio-economic problems, the massive and forced ideological treatment of local Muslims by missionaries of radical Islamic movements, the moral and psychological deformation and deformation of local value orientations.

The following table shows selected data reflecting various indicators of the radicalization of Muslims in Central Asian states.

Rating of radicalization of Muslims in Central Asia

Country	Members to ISIS	Global index of terrorism	Number of sentenced Muslims		Number of banned religious organizations
			Total	For religious extremism	
Kyrgyzstan	500-800	80 th place	10,517	554	21
Uzbekistan	500	132 nd place	43,900	12800	15
Kazakhstan	400	75 th place	39,219	656	24
Tajikistan	380	74 th place	9,317	600	17
Turkmenistan	360	138 th place	30,452	More than 300	5

Considering the religious situation in entire Central Asia, it is impossible not to pay attention to issues of an extremely undesirable nature related to the radicalization of Muslims in the region.

First of all, the problems of “terrorist migration” is very acute in Central Asia. An analysis of the terrorist activities of Central Asian immigrants in these organizations was given an important place in the 24th report published by the UN for the Security Council committee on the activities of the banned ISIS, Al Qaeda and other terrorist movements. By definition of UN experts, people from Central Asia are influential leaders of the militants of various terrorist organizations. According to the October report of the New York analytical organization “Soufan Group”, the main locations of Central Asian radicals were Syria and Iraq. According to them, out of 40 thousand militants of the Islamic state, 8717 were immigrants from the countries of the former USSR. About five thousand of them came from Central Asian countries. [27]

It was noted that immigrants from the Central Asian countries are fighting in such groups as “Katiba at - Tauhid”, “Val Jihad” and “Katiba al - Imam al - Bukhari”. According to the scientist of the Royal College of London C. Winter, immigrants from Central Asia have a reputation for elite strength within the Islamic state. [28]

The table compiled on this issue contains official data, which, unfortunately, are far from the truth. For example, according to the American newspaper, the Times in the Islamic state are from two to four thousand immigrants from Central Asia. According to analysts at the American analytical center Soufan Center, 1,500 people left Uzbekistan to fight for the Islamic State, 1,300 from Tajikistan, just over 500 from Kyrgyzstan, about 400 people from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. According to Kyrgyz expert on international

relations, Chynara Esengul, 860 Kyrgyz citizens are fighting in the ranks of ISIS. According to the head of the Eurasian Analytical Club N. Mendkovich, about 1,100 people, or 13.3 people per 100,000 population of the republic, left Tajikistan for Syria and Iraq. This indicator in Kyrgyzstan is 10.5 people, in Kazakhstan 1.8 people. [29]

Thus, a variety of information is available on the number of citizens of Central Asian states located in the areas of military operations in Syria and Iraq; data on dead and returning citizens of the states of the region vary. According to the results of the study, young people from 16 to 35 years old go to «terrorist migration». The reason is not so much hopeless poverty as life's impasse, clan nepotism, lack of social elevators, unfavorable social background, criminalization of youth, etc.

As the data of the compiled table and research results, as well as expert opinions, show that the problems of “terrorist migration” are acute in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. While 400 and 500 people left

problems of “terrorist migration” are acute in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Kazakhstan with 18,790,963 population and Uzbekistan with 31,795,634 population, from Kyrgyzstan with 6,361,166 population from Kyrgyzstan 500-800 people left to Syria and Iraq.

Almost half of them are women and children. According to various sources, 44 Kyrgyz returned to their homeland, and 150 were killed. [30]

Unfortunately, dangerous conditions for recruiting young people remain in the Central Asian states. According to T. Krasik, senior adviser to the research organization Yulf State Analytics, Central Asia has become a strategic direction for the Islamic state in which the Islamic State hopes to find new recruits for itself. Most importantly, in such a situation, any destabilization of a political, ethnic, social, religious, economic nature in one of the countries of the region can lead to the return of “terrorist migrants,” infiltration of terrorist groups from outside, and the activation of already returning and sleeping cells in Central Asian countries.

The level of radicalization of Muslims in Central Asia and the degree of instability of the domestic political situation in these countries are reflected in the Global Terrorism Index. This index measures the level of terrorist activity within the state of the world according to four main parameters. The number of terrorist acts, the number of victims of terrorist incidents, the number of injured citizens and the amount of property damage are considered.

The Global Terrorism Index is a ranking that defines the safest and most dangerous states in the world. The index was developed

by the international organization of scientists at the Institute of Peace Economics (the institute for Economics and Peace) of the University of Sydney. A huge contribution was made by scientists of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism at the University of Maryland, which has the world's largest statistics on terrorist activities, information on more than 100 thousand terrorist attacks around the world.

The position of the countries of the world in the Global Terrorism Index is determined based on the value of the index. That is, if a state has a higher index value, then terrorist acts more often occur in that state. Conversely, if the index value is lower, then there is no terrorist danger in these states. According to the rating of 2018, the countries of Central Asia are located as follows. Of the 163 countries in the world, Tajikistan (74th place), Kazakhstan (75th place) and Kyrgyzstan (80th place) were recognized as countries with a high level of terrorist danger. [31]

The high level of terrorist danger in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was also recognized as the obedience of the republics themselves. So, according to the results of a large-scale sociological study conducted by Kazakhstani scientist A.V.

Reshetnyak, a comprehensive analysis of public opinion on the problems of terrorism and religious extremism in modern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was

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carried out. It was found that in Kazakhstan 54.5% of respondents consider the possibility of terrorist attacks quite real. In Kyrgyzstan, 78% of those polled consider the threat of terrorism real. [32]

Of course, the authorities should contrast the entire range of preventive measures with the trends of the intensification and spread of religious radicalism. Such ideas of tolerance and readiness for constructive cooperation. The need to improve legislation in the religious sphere and the ability to clearly implement the adopted laws and policy documents. The ability of power, public and religious institutions to fruitfully interact in the field of religious education and in solving social problems of society, especially youth.

At the same time, when the methods of persuasion and coercion prove to be insufficient, law enforcement agencies should play an important role in countering religious radicalism. Although practice shows that repressive methods against religious radicalism often do not achieve their goal, law enforcement agencies must fulfill their responsibilities to protect the rule of law, law and order and the inviolability of the constitutional state system.

In this regard, the authorities of Uzbekistan take a very tough

stance. The United States Commission on Religious Freedom in the World (USCIRF) 2018 published an annual report on the observance of religious freedom in the world, which included Uzbekistan among the countries of “particular concern”. At the same time, experts note that in Uzbekistan there are 12,800 prisoners for religious reasons. [33]

A very negative trend is observed in Kyrgyzstan. Over the past year alone, the Kyrgyz special services destroyed seven terrorists and prevented 13 terrorist attacks, the organizers of which were religious extremists. The participation of Kyrgyz women in extremist activities is noticeably intensifying. If, in 2005, the share of women in committing extremist crimes was 1.1%, then by 2016 the share of women increased to 23%. [34]

Accordingly, such terrorist activity has become the reason that for 2010 -2019. the number of people convicted of terrorism and extremism in Kyrgyzstan increased by almost 10 times, and prisoners in closed correctional institutions - three times. If in 2010, 62 prisoners were serving sentences for such crimes, in 2012 - 100, in 2017 - 191, then in 2019 - already 554 people. [35] One in five convicted of crimes of a terrorist nature and extremist orientation is women. Most of the convicts are people aged 31-45 years (48.7%). More than 83.7% of those convicted of a crime of a terrorist nature and extremist orientation are registered with the criminal executive inspectorates of the south of the Osh, Batken and Jalal-Abad regions. [36]

Unfortunately, prisons in Central Asia remain hotbeds for extremists. Therefore, as the chairman of the State Penitentiary Service of Kyrgyzstan T Zhaparov noted, in 2019 in Kyrgyzstan a special type of corps was put into operation for holding prisoners convicted of terrorism and religious extremism. The State Penitentiary Service introduced the full-

Unfortunately, prisons in Central Asia remain hotbeds for extremists.

time position of theologians.

Paradoxical as it may seem, despite the relatively democratic domestic rules and conditions, in Kyrgyzstan there are a relatively large number of people convicted of terrorism and religious extremism, as well as a relatively large number of banned religious organizations. Formally, this is evidenced by the actual data given in the table. According to the table, it can be seen that if one counts the number of people convicted of terrorism and religious extremism per capita in Central Asian countries and count the number of banned religious organizations, Kyrgyzstan will be the leader in the region. On the other hand, it speaks of inefficient use, weak application of measures and opportunities of democracy and the rule of law. This indicates

excessive liberalism and connivance of the Kyrgyz authorities. It is precisely because of this that the religious situation in Kyrgyzstan is in such a state of neglect that the state's immunity has become weak to threatening limits. Therefore, having realized it, the authorities began to more actively apply repressive measures in restoring the appropriate order in the religious sphere.

Considering the issues of prohibited religious organizations in the countries of Central Asia, it should be noted that in this issue there is no single approach in the states of the region. Different states relate differently to one or another religious organization and prohibitive measures are applied to them differently. Of course, in the Central Asian countries the same radical religious organizations are present, but the degree of danger and the level of their influence differ. For example, the followers of Salafism and Takfirism are the most dangerous. Their activity is observed in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan. In Uzbekistan, the position of Hizb ut Tahrir is stronger; in Kyrgyzstan, supporters of the Tabligh Jamaat prevail. Therefore, the religious organization Tablig-i-Jamoat is banned in all countries of Central Asia, and in Kyrgyzstan it operates freely.

Different states relate differently to one or another religious organization and prohibitive measures are applied to them differently.

Banned religious organization in Central Asian countries.

Organizations	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan
«Al-Qaida»	Banned	Banned	-	Banned	-
«Islamic Movement of Turkmenistan»	Banned	Banned	-	Banned	-
«Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan»	Banned	Banned	Banned	Banned	-
«Kurdish National Congress»	Banned	Banned	-	-	-
«Asbat al-Ansar»	Banned	-	-	-	-
«Muslim brothers»	Banned	-	-	-	-
«Taliban Movement»	Banned	Banned	-	Banned	-
«Jaishul Mahdi»	-	Banned	-	-	-
«Boz gurd»	Banned	-	-	-	-
«Jamaat of Central Asian Mujahedeens»	Banned	-	-	-	-
«Lashkar-e Taiba»	Banned	-	-	-	-
«Union of Social Reforms»	Banned	-	-	-	-
«Hizbut Tahrir»	Banned	Banned	Banned	Banned	Banned
«AUM Sinrekyo»	Banned	Banned	-	-	-
«East Turkestan Liberation Organization»	Banned	Banned	-	Banned	Активация V. Чтобы активировать «Параметры».
«Islamic party of Turkmenistan»	Banned	-	-	-	-
«Djund-al-Halifat»	Banned	-	-	-	-
«Faith.Education.Life»	Banned	-	-	-	-
«Tbilisi Djamagat»	Banned	-	Banned	Banned	Banned
«At-takfirual-hidjra»	Banned	-	-	-	-
«Islamic State»	Banned	-	-	Banned	Banned
«Army of Tayyib»	-	-	-	Banned	-
«Ata Jol»	Banned	-	-	-	-

Missionary organization "Sozmoni Tabligat "	-	-	-	Banned	-
«Liberty of Tajikistan»	-	-	-	Banned	-
«Jamaat Ansarullah»	-	Banned	-	Banned	-
«Akromiya»	-	Banned	-	-	-
«Church of Unity» (Church of Muna)	Banned	Banned	Banned	-	-
Group of Islamic Jihad	-	Banned	Banned	-	-
Taliban	Banned	Banned	Banned	Banned	Banned
Hizb an-Nusrat («Victory Party»)	-	-	Banned	-	-
«Nurjular»	-	-	Banned	-	-
«Salafi (Wahabbi)»	-	-	Banned	Banned	Banned
Bahiats (Bahai community)	-	-	Banned	-	-
ISIS	Banned	Banned	Banned	Banned	Banned
Djamiyati Tabligat	-	-	-	Banned	-
Jamaat of Lebanon	-	-	Banned	-	-
«Islamic Party of Liberty»	-	-	Banned	-	-
«Fans of Paradise»	-	Banned	-	-	-
«Jabhat an-Nusra»	-	Banned	-	Banned	-
Total:	20	17	0	13	1

Because of this situation, considering the CSTO's passivity in compiling the list of banned terrorist organizations, the President of Kyrgyzstan S. Jeenbekov, as chairman of the Collective Security Council, asked to expedite the introduction of appropriate amendments to the national laws of the CSTO member countries. He said on May 20, 2019 at a meeting with participants in the field session of the Council of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly.

Factors of Stabilization of the Religious Situation in the Region

Under these conditions, in the Central Asian states, the presence and effectiveness of constraints, stabilizing factors began to play an important role. Although, in many respects, they played an important role as deterrents. In other conditions, on the contrary, not timeliness, adequacy, weakness, and therefore low efficiency of these factors turned out to be determinants and catalysts for the aggravation of the religious situation and radicalization of a certain part of Muslims, especially Muslim youth.

Basically, in all countries of the region an authoritarian system of state power was formed, which ensured domestic political conservative stability. Consequently, the rigid vertical power and domestic political conservative stability successfully supported a relatively stable religious situation within the country. Although, there are basically harsh repressive-coercive measures and methods.

As can be seen from the following table, the most unstable domestic political situation is observed in Kyrgyzstan.

Index of domestic political stability in Central Asian states

Country	Presidents	Prime-ministers	Chairpersons State Commission for Religious Affairs	“Mufti”
Kyrgyzstan	5	30	12	10
Tajikistan	4	8	4	2
Uzbekistan	2	5	4	4
Turkmenistan	2	1	2	5
Kazakhstan	2	11	6	4

Over the years of independence, two revolutions took place in Kyrgyzstan, the Constitution was changed 10 times, early parliamentary elections took place two times, presidents of the country were replaced five times, 18 speakers led the republic's parliament and 30 prime ministers. The directors of the State Commission for Religious Affairs were replaced 12 times. The state body that controls the religious situation within the country several times experienced various reforms, renaming and changed its status.

Such instability was accompanied by an unstable and conflict situation in the leadership of the Muslim clergy themselves. As a result of dirty intrigues, internecine, even criminal squabbles over the years of independence, 10 muftis were replaced in the republic.

It is no secret that in all these processes Kyrgyzstan took

an active part - Muslims, ranging from a Muslim president to an ordinary Muslim citizen. Of course, in such conditions, it was very difficult to implement a systematic and effective religious state policy that restrained undesirable trends and stimulated the constructive development of state-religious relations. On the contrary, due to the crisis of liberal and democratic reforms in Kyrgyzstan, there is frustration, doubt and discontent among citizens, including believers. Gradually liberal democratic values are discredited and lose their significance. Under these conditions, the post-Soviet ideological vacuum was filled with religious values, including those introduced from outside which were inconsistent with the local, the traditional Islam of the Hanafi maskhab and were unconstructive, and sometimes even radical.

Unlike Kyrgyzstan, other states of the region, thanks to the authoritarian domestic political order, tried to maintain a general conservatively stable situation in their countries. Consequently, a more stable situation was maintained in the religious sphere of these countries.

Another important point in the effectiveness or inefficiency of domestic political factors for creating the optimal religious situation in the countries of the region is related to the efficiency and lead time of adopted normative legal acts and socio-political measures. For example, in this sense, the problems of a clear legislative definition, an adequate understanding and clear implementation of principles such as “secularism” of the state and “separation of religion from the state” were important. With the exception of Uzbekistan, with

the problems of a clear legislative definition, an adequate understanding and clear implementation of principles such as “secularism” of the state and “separation of religion from the state”

independence, all countries in the region have officially declared themselves secular states. Moreover, the principle of separation of religion from the state was proclaimed the most important sign of secular states. With the exception of Kazakhstan, this was enshrined in the

Constitutions of all countries in the region. Only in Kazakhstan was it enshrined in a separate law. Thus, de jure, all countries of the region automatically became part of the countries of the world where this principle was proclaimed. The constitutions of the Central Asian countries were not limited only to indications of the secular nature of the state or the separation of religion from the state. Separate articles of the Constitution also formally enshrined the right to freedom of conscience, the right to freedom of thought and religion.

However, the constitutional secularism of the states of the region determined only the most general, even abstract, and therefore far

from clear, parameters of the state's attitude to religion and religious organizations. The national constitutions and legislative acts of the countries of Central Asia do not clearly disclose the model, norm, degree and level of secularism of states. Principles of separation of state from religion are not clearly defined, and how religion is separated from the state is not defined. In many ways, all this was connected with a formal approach to this crucial issue. For example, the French model, inherited from the Soviet past and assuming a total separation of the state from religion, was mechanically taken as the basis of the secular state. Although the situation in France, at the time of adopting this model, and then the situation in the atheistic Soviet Union and in modern Central Asian countries, the survivors of religious renaissance were completely different.

It was not only the principles and models of religious policy of Central Asian states that were formalized and mechanically adopted. If one believes the results of a study by the American scholar Edward Lemon, then in fact the entire legislative base of the religious policy of Central Asian countries was artificially built on the basis of Russian legislation regulating the religious sphere. He used a special program for analysis and found out that 79% of the laws of Kyrgyzstan against terrorism and extremism were written off from their Russian counterparts. In second place is Tajikistan - 56% of laws are written off, in Kazakhstan and in Uzbekistan these indicators show 4 and 5%. [37]

It means that other states' constitution in Central Asia either did not work or they worked weakly or did not work correctly. Despite this, in the countries of Central Asia, the actual implementation of the political and legal doctrines of the state in the religious sphere had both similar and distinctive features.

Unfortunately, the similarity basically lies in the fact that the political and legal reality in Central Asian countries is de facto seriously different from the legislation of these states, and not for the better. Because of this, many questions about religious freedoms, the secularity of the state, and the principle of separation of religion from the state are simply not appropriate.

In summary, it should be recognized that despite serious changes in the politics and legislation of Central Asian countries in the field of religion and religious organizations, there are many problems. The main thing is that the laws are not so much aimed at observing and expanding the constitutional rights and freedoms of believers

The national constitutions and legislative acts of the countries of Central Asia do not clearly disclose the model, norm, degree and level of secularism of states.

as at the arbitrary interpretation of laws for the benefit of those in power, limiting and regulating the activities of believers and religious organizations.

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it was on the territory of Central Asia, especially on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, that a promising and fateful East-West meeting took place. The ideas of the Western liberal-democratic perspective, Western secularism and the ideas of Eastern authoritarianism, Islamic

traditionalism began to prove their advantages and their prospects.

In this situation, in a situation of political and regulatory uncertainty, the Central Asian authorities received a kind of *carte blanche* and began to conduct different religious policies. For example, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, in accordance with political doctrine, have chosen an authoritarian way to solve religious issues. The faithful and religious organizations of these countries were not exempted from the guardianship of the state. Therefore, the real, rather than formal, situation in these states of Central Asia still resembles the Soviet period in regulation of religious sphere. That is, dogmatism and inertia prevail in state thinking in solving religious problems, excessive administration predominates, and control and tough interference in activities of religious organizations are imposed. In these countries, repressive-coercive and punitive methods prevail in regulation of religious issues. In general, a strong vertical of power and a powerful repressive apparatus, cementing domestic political conservative stability, quickly and efficiently solve complex issues of religious policy and support a strong deterrent position of state power in religious sphere.

Similar religious policies of authorities in Kazakhstan are satisfied by 59.2% of Muslims in the country. At the same time, only 15.2% support the secularism and 11% support the establishment of religious norms at the legislative level, as Sharia norms in Muslim countries. [38]

Another situation is in Kyrgyzstan. If, despite the *de jure* liberal constitutional and legal conditions, the situation that created legal uncertainty in the political and legal field, in every way allowed virtually all the states of Central Asia to pursue a rigid religious policy, then in the case of Kyrgyzstan, a different situation emerged. Under conditions of excessive liberalism and loyalty in the religious

sphere, the principle of secularism of the state and the principle of separation of religion from the state were interpreted quite liberally. Referring to these principles, the state power of Kyrgyzstan, on the one hand, took a dogmatic position and positioned itself as a secular state in every way ignored the values and positive potential of Islam. In particular, she ignored and refused to acknowledge the presence and spread of Islamic education in the country. On the other hand, referring to the separation of religion from the state, the country's government did not actually intervene in the rapid and large-scale process of Islamization of society.

This was largely due to the fact that post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, which in the Soviet past only had the experience of an uncompromising struggle with religion, stepped over from militant atheism of state-religious relations to liberal-democratic relations, without considering the peculiarities of the historical situation. Thus, for more than a quarter century, the state and religion functioned separately from each other. Numerous and complex issues have arisen that require immediate intervention and urgent solutions, which, unfortunately, have not been resolved. As a result of all this, the religious policy of Kyrgyzstan was very neglected and incompetent, and the religious situation in the country was in a very difficult situation.

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This situation causes discontent on two sides. On the one hand, because of the uncontrolled and forced Islamization of the country, discontent is presented by representatives of the country's civil society. On the other hand, representatives of local traditional Islam are worried and displeased by the unhindered and intense spread of aggressive - radical currents of non-traditional Islam.

Therefore, 34% of Muslims in Kyrgyzstan were convinced of the failure of the state's religious policy. [39] The weakness and corruption of state power, the lack of a systematic state policy and an effective legislative base led to the formation of a vacuum of power in this area. Because of this, according to a study by the Institute of Islamic Studies (2018), 33.33% of youth respondents supported the idea of turning Kyrgyzstan into a state that lives according to Sharia law. Respondents supporting the secular future of Kyrgyzstan remained as minority (32.32%). [40]

According to the research of R. Jalil, the degradation and devaluation of the state power of Kyrgyzstan, and therefore the disappointment and unwillingness to live under a weak and corrupt government, was more sharply expressed. Thus, 36.7% of respondents

agreed that politicians who do not believe in God are unsuitable for public office, 56.8% agreed that people with strong religious beliefs should hold public office, and 36.4% expressed willingness to vote for an Islamic political party if such a party participates in elections. [41]

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Although late, the fallacy of such a policy was officially recognized by the top government at a meeting of the country's Security Council in 2014.

in 2014. Behind this dry and official wording of the erroneous religious policy of the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, it was hidden and was not openly told about the policy of connivance, flirting, false liberalism and corruption of the

authorities even in this delicate matter. In any case, recent years have been marked by increased attention of the Kyrgyz government to religious security issues.

In February and November 2014 and September 1, 2015, three meetings of the Council of Defense, the main Constitutional body implementing a unified state policy in the field of defense and security, were devoted to religious security in the country. The Decree of the President of Kyrgyzstan "On implementation of the decision of the Defense Council of the Kyrgyz Republic on state policy in the religious sphere (December 7, 2014) recognizes that "the position of non-interference, the weakening of the regulatory functions of the state in the religious sphere are erroneous strategy." As a result of the decisions of the Defense Council of Kyrgyzstan, a new Concept of state policy in the religious sphere of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2014-2020 was developed, a thorough analysis of the activities of the State Committee for National Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Commission for Religious Affairs, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan.

In order to implement the concept, a comprehensive plan of the state policy of Kyrgyzstan in the religious sphere for 2015-2020 was adopted. In accordance with this plan, in order to improve the legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic in the religious sphere, appropriate amendments and additions were made to the laws "On Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations of the Kyrgyz Republic", "On Countering Extremist Activities", "On the Prevention of Crimes in the Kyrgyz Republic", "On the internal affairs bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic", "On the national security bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic", "On education", "On culture", "On local state administration", «On Local Self-Government», «On mass media», the Criminal Code and the Code of the Kyrgyz Republic about the administrative responsibility, and others.

Thus, Kyrgyzstan for a long time was in a situation of uncertainty, faced with a choice - to continue the liberal. There are difficult and risky ways of developing religious relations that had developed before, or to return to the forcibly-repressive way of resolving religious issues preserved, as the legacy of Soviet Union, now in other countries of the region.

Foreign policy deterrents of religious radicalism and extremism in Central Asian region are connected, firstly, with global security systems, and secondly, and most importantly, with regional security systems. Possibility of minimizing and repelling external threats lie primarily within Central Asia itself. That is, Central Asia itself must create its own system of effective regional security.

Unfortunately, post-Soviet Central Asia as a whole does not yet have a coordinated and strong collective system of regional security. It is at the stage of formation and requires joint, patient and systematic work of the states of the region. Mutual understanding, mutual trust and mutual concessions are required. In the meantime, due to the lack of a clear understanding of the complexity of situation, the competing ambitions of the leaders of countries of the region, and therefore the lack of coordination of forces and means, as well as the diversity of the foreign policy of Central Asian states. There is no close interaction between the countries of the region in the framework of regional and global cooperation systems as reflected in the following table.

Integration factors of stability

Countries	CIS	EAEU	CBMД	CSTO	SCO	NATO	WTO	C5+1
Kazakhstan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kyrgyzstan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uzbekistan	+	-	+	- from 2013	+ from 2001	+	-	+
Tajikistan	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Turkmenistan	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+

As can be seen from the table, all the states of the region are members of the amorphous and ineffective, more politicized alliance of the CIS, which plays a very weak role in matters of collective security. If we take economic projects, then in the pro-Western WTO Central Asia is represented by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and in the pro-Russian EAEU only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are present.

In the pro-Western military-political alliance of NATO, as members of the Partnership for Peace project, despite its weakness and inefficiency, all countries of the region are present. Launched in 2015 by US Secretary of State J. Kerry, the C5 + 1 geopolitical project includes a dialogue at the level of foreign ministers of 5 Central Asian republics and the USA. That is, all Central Asian republics are united in this format. At the first meeting in Samarkand (November 2015), six ministers agreed on the development of regional projects to

improve security, the economy and resilience to the effects of climate change. At the second meeting in Washington (2016), an agreement was reached on the launch of six projects in the amount of up to \$ 15 million. USA. The first project was promising - the “Regional Dialogue of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum”, which had the ambitious task of confronting the challenges of foreign terrorist fighters and radicalization, violence in Central Asia. [42]

Other organizations that have a wide range of cooperation, including the military-political, economic, humanitarian spheres of cooperation, are of regional origin. Thus, the SCO, CSTO and Council of Ministers of Internal Affairs (CMIA) pursue regional interests. The largest of them is the SCO, which some Western experts regard as a challenge to US interests, as an organization similar to the Warsaw Pact, or as NATO of the East. SCO members are all Central Asian countries, with the exception of Turkmenistan.

The CSTO military-political organization unites three republics of the region, except for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The International Forum Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), initiated by N. Nazarbayev and consisting of 21 states of the Asian

The CSTO military-political organization unites three republics of the region, except for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

continent, includes 4 Central Asian republics, that is, all republics except Turkmenistan.

The diversity in regional political, military - political, trade and economic processes are only one side of the problem. Moreover, there are a number of unsolved acute problems between the countries of the region on issues of state borders, transport corridors, hydropower resources, interethnic relations, etc. For example, a particularly explosive situation develops in the triangle Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan. So far, 371 km of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek and 471 km of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border have not been dismantled or demarcated. There are controversial Tajik-Uzbek sites. Because of this, in the last 10 years, that is, since 2010, with the participation of Kyrgyzstan, an average of at least 10-12 border conflicts of varying degrees of intensity with neighboring states has been recorded annually. So far in 2019, 12 conflicts between citizens and security forces of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan occurred in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan [43].

The analysis of trade, economic and humanitarian relations shows the disunity of the states of the region, which at times turn into sporadic trade wars, economic blockades and trade and economic sabotage against each other. Until recently, relations between the leaders of Central Asian countries were tense. Only on March 15 - 2019, for the first time in 13 years, the leaders of the Central Asian

states gathered together in consultative meetings in the capital of Kazakhstan. The foreign ministers of Central Asian states first met together only on September 2, 2017. And then, at the site of the UN General Assembly in New York.

In fairness, it should be noted that there were separate attempts, proposals by the states of the region to create a real collective security system for the countries of Central Asia. For example, during the VI Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan (December 2016) in the city of Amritsar, (India), the Kazakh delegation called on Central Asian countries to unite in the fight against terrorism, extremism and illegal migration. A little later, that is, in March 2017, the presidents of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan agreed on joint efforts in the fight against crime terrorism. [44] Unfortunately, all these and other initiatives and proposals basically remained only on paper, as good wishes. In a word, on the basis of all this, it can be assumed that the joint efforts of the countries of the region are still able to minimize the threats of religious radicalism and extremism... nothing more.

Given all this, the experts of the recent XVI Eurasian Media Forum (Almaty) - political scientists, economists, scientists from other fields, are very pessimistic about the current situation and the prospects for regional integration of Central Asian countries. In particular, K. Abduseitov, coordinator of the international programs of the Foundation of the First President of Kazakhstan, noted that “so far the idea of unification of Central Asia is very vague”. The representative of Uzbekistan - the head of the department of Information and Analytical Center for International Relations M.Uzakov suggested that his country is not yet ready to use the term “integration”, since integration implies an institutional commitment and leads to a decrease in the sovereignty of each republic. And according to the Kyrgyz political scientist Sh. Baktygulov, it is not worth rushing things yet. [45]

However, the situation in the world, in the region and within individual states of Central Asia related to religious extremism and religious terrorism requires immediate and effective decisions on religious security. Therefore, the Bishkek SCO Summit (June 14, 2019) adopted the “Bishkek Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO Member States”. The Declaration stated: “Member States believe that the increasing attention and close coordination and constructive interaction of the world community are required by the growing and becoming cross-border security challenges and threats

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- terrorism, the spread of terrorist and extremist ideology. The desire to expand and deepen the interaction of member states in countering threats to stability and security in the SCO space was emphasized. The member states noted with satisfaction the performance of the SCO Convention on Countering Extremism, as well as the results of the Meeting of the Ministers of Defense of the SCO member states (Bishkek April 29, 2019) and the meeting of the secretaries of the Security Council of the SCO member states (Bishkek, 14-15 May 2019).

The next day, on 15.06.19, in Dushanbe, the 5th CICA Summit was held, which adopted the Declaration of the Fifth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia “A Common Vision of a Safe and More Prosperous CICA Region”. In this Declaration, it was noted that “Recognizing the growing threat that transnational organized crime poses to the security and prosperity of the region, and also taking into account the link in some cases between international terrorism, transnational organized crime and extremism, we reaffirm the need and express our readiness to strengthen cooperation in accordance with international and relevant national law to counter transnational organized crime of fidelity.”

It is noteworthy that, speaking at the CICA meeting, the President of Kazakhstan K. Tokayev announced the possibility of creating a full-fledged collective security system based on CICA, capable of international mediation. An integral part of this idea is to ensure synergy between the potentials of the CICA and the OSCE for developing a plan of interaction across Eurasia, he said.

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At the meeting of the Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, held on 01.07.2019. in Bishkek, many of the issues noted in the Declarations of the two summits were specified, detailed and appropriate decisions were made. At the plenary session, documents on eight critical issues were considered and a list of additional issues on reducing tension in the Tajik-Afghan border area was discussed, providing for better coordination of the activities of the CSTO member states in Central Asia.

Thus, taking into account the challenges and threats in Central Asia, as well as increasing instability in the region, the countries of Central Asia gradually agree that immediate further close coordination and the search for mutually acceptable solutions to improve and strengthen regional security against international terrorism and transnational religious extremism are required.

Socio - economic Factors of Stability of the Region

It is no secret that in such an economically unsuccessful region as Central Asia, socio-economic factors also play a significant role in escalation of tension in society and in the landslide growth of adherents of both traditional Islam and radical Islamic movements. Crisis society is negatively affected by limited funds, the poverty of the majority of population, unemployment, internal and external migration, political and economic corruption, social discrimination, degradation and marginalization, moral and psychological deformation of certain segments of the population, and other negative aspects of a socio-economic nature.

Convincing evidence of this is the following disappointing macroeconomic indicators of most countries in the region, given in the table.

Socio economic factors of stability in Central Asia

Country	Per capita GDP (USD)	GNP in USD (bln.)	Literacy rate	Unemployment rate	Index of personal dev.
Kazakhstan	25700	159,4	99.79%	5.4%	56 th place
Turkmenistan	17300	40,48	99.77%	8.6%	109 th place
Uzbekistan	6500	48,6	99.76%	9.3%	114 th place
Kyrgyzstan	3500	6,02	99.59%	7.8%	120 th place
Tajikistan	3000	7,3	99.52%	13.2%	129 th place

The table testifies that in countries with low indicators there is a complex of unsolved problems of a socio-economic nature that are the determinants of difficult religious situation in these countries.

In world practice, one of the most significant and clear indicators of the level of economic status of states is the GNP and GDP per capita of countries. In the ranking of the world's economies compiled by the World Bank in 2017, the United States occupied the first line (19.4 trillion dollars), China came second (12 trillion dollars), and Japan occupied the third place (4.9. trillion dollars). In this ranking, the countries of Central Asia occupy: Kazakhstan 55th place (159 billion dollars), Uzbekistan 85th place (48.7 billion dollars), Turkmenistan - 88th place (42.3 billion dollars), Kyrgyzstan - 145th place (with 7.5 billion dollars) and Tajikistan-147 place with 7.1 billion dollars. If we

take GDP per capita, in Central Asian region, Kazakhstan takes 1st place, Turkmenistan-second, Uzbekistan-third Kyrgyzstan-fourth and Tajikistan-fifth. [46] The absolute and relative indicators of GDP, that is, the absolute volume of GDP and GDP per capita, are precisely correlated with the socio-economic achievements, well-being and problems of the countries of the region, which, in turn, have the most direct links with the escalation of the religious situation in these countries.

All this is clearly reflected in the table and convincingly proves that in countries with socio-economic problems as unemployment, marginalization and high immigration activity of the population are acute. Another negative consequence of socio-economic problems is the gradual decline in literacy. In this regard, the situation in Kyrgyzstan is typical of other crisis countries in Central Asia. According to UNICEF, in Kyrgyzstan 6% of school-age children do not attend school, 30% of Kyrgyz students are forced to combine work with study, and every year about nine thousand students in Kyrgyzstan leave school after grade 9. Perhaps, as a result of this trend, the literacy level of the population of Kyrgyzstan will decrease even further, and the intellectual degradation of society will continue along an increasing line, creating ever new opportunities for recruiting young people into the ranks of religious fanatics and extremists.

Yet, the Human Development Index (HDI) is considered to be a more convincing integral determinant and cross-country indicator of the level of development of countries of the world. The HDI, developed by a group of economists led by the Pakistani scientist Mahbut-ul-Haq, as a combined index measuring the level of development of the countries of the world, is compiled by UNDP based on the results

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of three main indicators of development of the countries of the world. Based on the HDI level, it is customary to classify the countries of the world as countries with a very high level of development (42 countries), high (43 countries), medium (42 countries) and low (42 countries)

level of development. As the integrated data shown in the table show, and on this indicator, very unfavorable positions among the countries of Central Asia are taken by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

In such conditions, social instability, domestic disorder and moral and psychological maladaptation act as determinants of religious radicalism. For, the impoverished and desperately marginal, especially young people, prone to radical ways of solving their problems, are forced to go to extreme methods of social protest. Of

course, other factors of the radicalization of society are not denied. But it is precisely the more mundane causes of a socio-economic and moral-psychological nature that play an important role in the psychological deformation, radicalization of consciousness, behavior and deformation of the worldview of Muslim believers.

Legal Factors of Religious Stability in the Region

In the observance of political, economic and religious stability in the country, the adequacy and effectiveness of the legal framework of the state plays an important role. Only in such a civilized state, the rule of law is the fundamental principle of legality and the guarantor of the stability of society. Only in such a truly legal state is the rule of law, the equality of all before the law and an independent court guaranteed, where civil rights and human rights, rights and freedom of believers are recognized and guaranteed. Only in such a “de facto” legal state can domestic political, economic and religious stability and security be ensured and protected by laws.

As we know, the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia as a transit state chose the form of a legal democratic state and the form of a state with authoritarian orders. Accordingly, in a number of states in the region, the rule of law was violated by prevalence of authoritarian principles of government. Of course, the style of authoritarian governance cannot be regarded only as a negative phenomenon. There are many examples when an authoritarian leader as an effective manager, resolving the problems of the state as soon as possible turned his country into a prosperous state.

A strong authoritarian regime, a rigid vertical power and a powerful repressive apparatus in such Central Asian countries as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan throughout the post-Soviet period maintain internal political stability in these states. Accordingly, the government of these countries occupy a tough position on the religious issue. And in general, such conservative stability so far brings certain positive results.

However, in ensuring the religious stability and religious security of the state, repressive measures by authoritarian regimes do not seem strategically convincing. Although, in the operational plan, they show their effectiveness, nevertheless, the disproportionate

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use of repressive and prohibitive measures, the lack of openness and constructive dialogue with believers, religious circles, the lack of soil for the socialization of religion, the atmosphere of fear lead to the opposite result. Of course, the right to freedom of religion and religious belief does not mean that there should be no legal restrictions in this matter. Although, often the radicalization of believers and religious movements is the result of excessive state pressure, and not external interference and the internal logic of the development of religion itself.

Unfortunately, the choice of a democratic path of development and the efforts to create a legal state with a clear and effective legislative base have also not yet yielded results. As the positions of the table show, in terms of legal and mental factors ensuring religious security, Kyrgyzstan is formally in a favorable position.

Legal and mental factors of stability of Central Asian countries

Countries	Rule of law rate	Index of democracy or rank of authoritarianism (points)	Pro-western
Kazakhstan	65 th place	3.06	1
Kyrgyzstan	85 th place	5.11	2
Uzbekistan	94 th place	1.95	3
Turkmenistan	-	1.72	4
Tajikistan	-	1.93	5

In 2019, experts from international independent organization World Justice Project (WJP) ranked the rule of law. According to its results, Kazakhstan took the first place among the countries of Central Asia (65th place in the world), Kyrgyzstan the second (85th place in the world), Uzbekistan the third place (94th place in the world), Tajikistan and Turkmenistan did not even get into rating. [47]

According to the rating conducted by the English research company The Economist Intelligence Unit, Kyrgyzstan took first place in Central Asia (5.11 points) and entered the group of countries in transitional regimes. As a rule, according to this Index of Democracy, analysts classify the countries of the world into four levels of democracy development: absolute democracy, imperfect democracy, transitional regime and authoritarian regime. Kazakhstan (3.06 points), Uzbekistan (1.95 points), Tajikistan (1.93 points) and Turkmenistan (1.72 points) are invariably in the group of authoritarian regimes. [48]

To some extent, the “Westernization Index 2018”, compiled by “strategEast” (USA) company, also determines the level of political, legal, economic, and cultural development of the countries of the former USSR. According to the results of the study, the countries of the former USSR were divided into four groups. The first group of genuine pro-Western countries includes Estonia, Lithuania and

Latvia. The second group «Pro-Western Facade» includes Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. The third - “The balancing group includes Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan made up the fourth group «fortress countries», as closed and not amenable to Western influence.

However, the presence of the necessary laws, formal well-being in ensuring the rule of law have not yet brought positive results in ensuring the proper religious security of the countries of the region. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, during a period of precarious balance and strategic uncertainty in the goals, methods, means and boundaries of the ongoing religious transformations, the advantages of a democratic state of law were not used to the full extent. Yes, in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, its own model of relations between the state and the religious sphere has formed, and its peculiarity lies in democratic principles and liberal relations between them. Here, despite some problematic issues in the religious sphere,

the state to a certain extent ensures freedom of conscience and maintains a multi-religious atmosphere. However, due to the lack of real subjectivity of the Muslim community of a country, Islam

has not yet achieved appropriate public attention, status and proper development. Because of this, due state-Islamic partnerships were not created during the post-Soviet transit. The reason for this was not only weak and not timely adopted legislative acts; representatives of the authorities, civil society, and the religious community, who manifested legal nihilism, social apathy, and political myopia, were also to blame. After all, the rule of law is not only a combination of sound legal norms, but also their excellent implementation. The strength of the rule of law lies in the presence of a strong, creative, dynamic society, which has the ability to force the ruling to impeccable and timely execution of the adopted laws.

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Power Factors of Stabilization of the Religious Situation in the Region

In the observance of political, economic and religious stability in the country, the adequacy and effectiveness of the legal framework of the state plays an important role. Only in such a civilized state, the rule of law is the fundamental principle of legality and the guarantor of the stability of society. Only in such a truly legal state is the rule of law, the equality of all before the law and an independent court guaranteed, where civil rights and human rights, rights and freedom of believers are recognized and guaranteed. Only in such a “de facto” legal state can domestic political, economic and religious stability and security be ensured and protected by laws.

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with authoritarian orders. Accordingly, in a number of states in the region, the rule of law was violated by prevalence of authoritarian principles of government. Of course, the style of authoritarian governance cannot be regarded only as a negative phenomenon. There are

many examples when an authoritarian leader as an effective manager, resolving the problems of the state as soon as possible turned his country into a prosperous state.

A strong authoritarian regime, a rigid vertical power and a powerful repressive apparatus in such Central Asian countries as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan throughout the post-Soviet period maintain internal political stability in these states. Accordingly, the government of these countries occupy a tough position on the religious issue. And in general, such conservative stability so far brings certain positive results.

However, in ensuring the religious stability and religious security of the state, repressive measures by authoritarian regimes do not seem strategically convincing. Although, in the operational plan, they show their effectiveness, nevertheless, the disproportionate use of repressive and prohibitive measures, the lack of openness and constructive dialogue with believers, religious circles, the lack of soil

for the socialization of religion, the atmosphere of fear lead to the opposite result. Of course, the right to freedom of religion and religious belief does not mean that there should be no legal restrictions in this matter. Although, often the radicalization of believers and religious movements is the result of excessive state pressure, and not external interference and the internal logic of the development of religion itself.

Unfortunately, the choice of a democratic path of development and the efforts to create a legal state with a clear and effective legislative base have also not yet yielded results. As the positions of the table show, in terms of legal and mental factors ensuring religious security, Kyrgyzstan is formally in a favorable position.

Legal and mental factors of stability of Central Asian countries

Country	Place in the world (2019г.)	Army number	Budget for military (USD)	% GNP	Police number
Uzbekistan	48	65,000	2 bln.	4	120,000
Kazakhstan	54	70,000	2.435 bln.	0,82	86,000
Turkmenistan	75	25,000	200 mln.	3,4	21,000
Kyrgyzstan	91	12,000	240 mln.	3,15	14,000
Tajikistan	94	16,000	75 mln.	1,25	36,000

In 2019, experts from international independent organization World Justice Project (WJP) ranked the rule of law. According to its results, Kazakhstan took the first place among the countries of Central Asia (65th place in the world), Kyrgyzstan the second (85th place in the world), Uzbekistan the third place (94th place in the world), Tajikistan and Turkmenistan did not even get into rating. [47]

According to the rating conducted by the English research company The Economist Intelligence Unit, Kyrgyzstan took first place in Central Asia (5.11 points) and entered the group of countries in transitional regimes. As a rule, according to this Index of Democracy, analysts classify the countries of the world into four levels of democracy development: absolute democracy, imperfect democracy, transitional regime and authoritarian regime. Kazakhstan (3.06 points), Uzbekistan (1.95 points), Tajikistan (1.93 points) and Turkmenistan (1.72 points) are invariably in the group of authoritarian regimes. [48]

To some extent, the “Westernization Index 2018”, compiled by “strategEast” (USA) company, also determines the level of political, legal, economic, and cultural development of the countries of the former USSR. According to the results of the study, the countries of the former USSR were divided into four groups. The first group of genuine pro-Western countries includes Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. The second group «Pro-Western Facade» includes Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. The third - “The balancing group includes

Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan made up the fourth group «fortress countries», as closed and not amenable to Western influence.

However, the presence of the necessary laws, formal well-being in ensuring the rule of law have not yet brought positive results in ensuring the proper religious security of the countries of the region. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, during a period of precarious balance and strategic uncertainty in the goals, methods, means and boundaries of the ongoing religious transformations, the advantages of a democratic state of law were not used to the full extent. Yes, in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, its own model of relations between the state and the religious sphere has formed, and its peculiarity lies in democratic principles and liberal relations between them. Here, despite some problematic issues in the religious sphere, the state to a certain extent ensures freedom of conscience and maintains a multi-religious atmosphere. However, due to the lack of real subjectivity

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of the Muslim community of a country, Islam has not yet achieved appropriate public attention, status and proper development. Because of this, due state-Islamic partnerships were not created during the post-Soviet transit. The reason for this was not only weak and not

timely adopted legislative acts; representatives of the authorities, civil society, and the religious community, who manifested legal nihilism, social apathy, and political myopia, were also to blame. After all, the rule of law is not only a combination of sound legal norms, but also their excellent implementation. The strength of the rule of law lies in the presence of a strong, creative, dynamic society, which has the ability to force the ruling to impeccable and timely execution of the adopted laws.

Historical experience shows that always the main emphasis of state security is placed on force factors. At the same time, the richest experience of history testifies to the presence of a large number of preventive measures of a preventive nature and non-force methods to ensure the security of the state. Moreover, the beginning of the 21st century is characterized by the emergence of new forces, new orders and new challenges along with traditionally existing ones, when force methods played an exceptional role.

Changes in the system of geopolitical forces, states, nations, faiths and in the lives of people that took place at the beginning of the 21st century led to the transformation of the security accents of states and regions. That is, the emphasis is shifted to the full use

of non-force methods to ensure regional and state security. As we have already noted, there is a whole range of socio-economic, moral-psychological and political-legal possibilities for ensuring stability and security of the state.

However, this does not exclude the possibility of using force factors as an extreme and effective argument in ensuring the stability and security of states, as an instrument for effectively deterring, preventing and repelling various kinds of clashes, violence, and aggressions of religious extremists. Moreover, the specifics of the speeches of radical believers, religious extremists and terrorists require the states of the region to use the entire arsenal of non-violent and forceful methods of maintaining the stability and security of Central Asian states.

Therefore, in recent years, the countries of Central Asia have begun to pay more attention to strengthening the power structures of states, taking into account global and regional trends. The military doctrines of the countries of the region were revised and updated, and the armed forces are being built and modernized every year. There is an increase in quantitative and qualitative indicators of the armed forces of Central Asian countries.

Central Asian countries' solvency

Country	Index of collective wellness	Domestic and foreign sovereignty	Index wellness integration	Index of political instability	Index of weakness
Uzbekistan	0,92	0,7	0,81	59,2	61,6
Kazakhstan	0,31	0,79	0,55	50,6	71,4
Turkmenistan	0,42	0,57	0,50	46,7	75,7
Kyrgyzstan	0,34	0,56	0,45	45,3	76,2
Tajikistan	0,26	0,55	0,41	41,3	77,7

Most importantly, the military spending of the states of the region is increasing every year, which in total is about five billion US dollars. For example, according to Finprom.kz., An analytical economic agency, for the first two months of 2019, defense spending in Kazakhstan amounted to 136.4 billion tenge (\$ 356 million), compared with 78.9 billion tenge (207 million US dollars) for the same period last year. If in Uzbekistan in the early 2000s, military spending amounted to 0.5-1.6% of GDP, in recent years they have grown to 4.8% of GDP. If in 2004 the military budget of Turkmenistan amounted to 165 million US dollars, in recent years they have reached up to 200 million US dollars. Tajikistan's military spending increased from 1.0% of GDP in 2008 to 1.25% of GDP in 2016. Kyrgyzstan's military spending increased from 1.53% of 1993 GDP to 3.15% of GDP in 2016 [49].

The ranking of the world states in terms of military power is determined by the Global Firepower Index (GFP), which includes

more than 50 different indicators. At the end of 2019, Uzbekistan became the leader in the Central Asian region in military power, Kazakhstan took the second place. Unfortunately, as can be seen from the table, both in terms of military power, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the weakest links in the region.

However, the strength of Kyrgyzstan's weakness lies in cohesion, patriotism, mobilization and in the high fighting spirit of civil society. This property of the country's civil society was manifested during the Batken wars against international terrorist groups in 1999-2000, as

This property of the country's civil society was manifested during the Batken wars against international terrorist groups in 1999-2000,

well as during the March 2005 revolution. and the April Revolution of 2010. When the militias and people's volunteers were actively involved in the fighting of the Batken wars, in restoring public order and in preventing morale during

revolutionary events. Equally important are government measures aimed at respecting social justice, reducing inequality, aimed at pursuing a liberal and effective religious policy, and supporting traditional Islam. Therefore, most citizens of Kyrgyzstan see the key to solving the problems of radicalization in the use of "soft" tools. That is, in the development of civil society (77%), an increase in the role of NGOs (54%), in improving religious education and counteracting the marginalization of those population groups at risk. In addition, according to Kyrgyz citizens, the official clergy should play a key role in the fight against extremism [50].

As a force factor, supporting stability in the country can be considered police officers. As the data in the table shows, here Kyrgyzstan has an unenviable position.

In general, the armed forces of Central Asian countries need further buildup. Limited and outdated technical arsenal requires accelerated modernization and replenishment. If, by international standards, the number of armed forces of the countries of the world on average is 1% of the total population of the state, then all the countries of Central Asia do not reach this level by almost half. For example, if there were 6,357,833 people living in Kyrgyzstan on January 1, 2019, therefore, the army should have amounted to about 63,578.33 people.

In these conditions, regional military-political alliances are a reliable shield for the Central Asian countries. For example, the total military budget of the SCO countries is 300-320 billion US dollars. The armed forces of this alliance serve 5.1 million troops. In addition, Russia and China are constantly providing assistance to the armed forces of Central Asian countries in equipping them with new military

equipment and weapons. They provide support in strengthening the protection of state borders, in the training and retraining of military personnel.

One of the final and integral moments in ensuring national and state security in Central Asia is considered to be the viability of the countries of the region. The viability of a state is determined by taking into account several factors of a socio-economic, socio-political and foreign policy nature.

For example, the level of the public good index is important. That is, the ability of the state to sufficiently and timely provide the population with public goods. In particular, the ability of the country's authorities to provide the population with food products, quality education, affordable health care, developed infrastructure, effective internal and external security, etc.

Based on the data in the table, we can make sure that the indices of public goods among the Central Asian states vary significantly and, accordingly, their solvency index also looks different.

Kazakhstan has the highest level of index, and in crisis Tajikistan a completely different socio-economic situation is taking shape. Due to a similar situation in these states, a specific situation is created that affects the religious situation in these countries in different ways.

An equally important factor in achieving the country's solvency is a sufficient level of the index of internal and external sovereignty of states. It is well known that sovereignty is the most important factor in the political and legal essence of the state and is a collective and integral feature of any state. Sovereignty provides the state with the opportunity to freely and independently exercise its domestic and foreign political functions. This means that sovereignty in the modern sense consists of completely different aspects - internal and external.

Internal sovereignty is the supremacy of the state in deciding the country's internal affairs - to establish a unified order in the state, determine the status of state bodies, vest the rights and obligations of officials and citizens, issue laws and monitor their implementation. State sovereignty includes such fundamental principles as unity, indivisibility and inviolability of territorial borders and non-interference in internal affairs. The concept of internal sovereignty includes economic, political and legal aspects.

External sovereignty means the independence of the state in international affairs, an independent foreign policy. A sovereign state on the world stage is not obliged to obey other states and has the

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right to act in its own interests. The lack of these rights is considered a sign of the weakness of any state and its inability to ensure its own sovereignty and national - state interest.

The aggregate indicators of the index of internal and external sovereignty of the Central Asian countries are reflected in the second column of the table. They indicate the degree of solvency of the states of the region, show their ability to maintain stability and security within their countries.

By calculating the arithmetic average of the indices of public goods, as well as the indices of internal and external sovereignty, we can obtain an integral index of the solvency of Central Asian states. The results obtained in this way, that is, the data in the third column of the table, show that the high integral solvency index belongs to Kazakhstan, and the solvency of the sovereign states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is estimated by low indices.

In determining the solvency of the state, a special place in importance is occupied by the index of political instability of the states of the world. The analytical department of The Economics magazine developed the Political Instability Index / PII [Economist Intelligence Unit 2018]. This index evaluates 165 countries of the world for the risk of social and economic destabilization. According to the report of political instability in 2009, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were among the most politically unstable countries in the world and took 33-38 place among 165 countries of the world. Uzbekistan took 71st place, Turkmenistan 75th place and Kazakhstan 124th place. [51]

In 2019, the international risk management team “Marsh”

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ranked the most important global political and economic risks. A map was compiled according to which countries with less than 49 points were considered politically unstable. Countries with more than 70 points were rated as politically

stable states. The results of this study regarding the countries of Central Asia are shown in the table. They show that Kazakhstan with 59.2 points and Turkmenistan with 50.6 points are among the politically stable countries. The remaining Central Asian states with low scores (Uzbekistan - 46.7, Kyrgyzstan - 45.3, Tajikistan - 41.3) were recognized as politically unstable countries [52].

As one can see, the results of the analysis of the two research systems regarding the political instability of the countries of Central Asia as a whole coincide. They also show which countries of the region where relative political stability is maintained, and in which countries the unstable socio-political situation prevails. It should be noted that

the results of the index of political instability generally coincide and correlate with the instability and non-standard religious situation in these countries.

The logical outcome of the analysis of the solvency of the Central Asian countries by four indices is the Failed States index. This is considered as a comprehensive indicator that shows the ability or inability of world governments to ensure the stability of the country, as well as to monitor the political economic and religious situation in the country.

Well-known political institutions, the non-governmental organization American Fund for Peace and the authoritative American journal Foreign policy annually determine the Fragile states index. According to the results of the study of the index of weakness of the states of the world, four levels of stability of the countries of the world are determined - a critical level, a dangerous level, a low level and lack of risk.

Under the name The failed states index, the index of weakness of states has been functioning since 2005. In 2014, it was renamed the Fragile states index, which in the Russian version is called the “State Disability Rating”.

To determine the index of state weakness, the analysis is carried out according to twelve fundamental criteria of state weakness, which consist of three groups (military-political, economic, social) criteria. In total, over 100 indicators are estimated.

According to the results of 2018, in terms of instability, all the countries of Central Asia were in the group of countries of the world whose position is rated as “Dangerous Level”. At the same time, Tajikistan has the highest level of instability (77.7 points), followed by Kyrgyzstan (76.2 points), Uzbekistan (75.7 points), Turkmenistan (71.4 points) and the most favorable situation in the region for Kazakhstan (61.6 points) [53].

Conclusion

At the end, we can conclude that in the process of the post-Soviet religious renaissance in the countries of Central Asia, a far from unambiguous situation has developed. Each country in the region, choosing its own path of post-Soviet development, tried to solve complex issues of sovereign state building. Accordingly, each state carried out its religious policy. As a result of this, each state has a special religious situation, with all positive and negative features. Therefore, each of them has achievements and omissions in the fight against religious extremism and international terrorism. There are states with weak and strong immunities in the region. For example, given certain undesirable trends and negative parameters in the country's development, external, as well as individual internal experts, call Kyrgyzstan a failed state. In world practice, the term "Failed state" means a state in which the government does not partially or fully control the situation in the country or does not control part of the territory. Of course, the situation in Kyrgyzstan is not so difficult. However, as some aspects of this work have shown, there are issues on which urgent work is required before the threat of religious extremism and international terrorism.

Until recently, all these positive and negative features of the states of the region, their strength and weakness, were purely independent affairs of each of all Central Asian countries. However, recent geopolitical changes in the world and in the region have put on the agenda the question of the collective responsibility of Central Asian countries for the security of the region and the creation of a collective regional security system against internal and external threats associated with religious extremism and international terrorism.

Unfortunately, despite the real threat of religious extremism and international terrorism, regional identity and systemic regional security in Central Asia have not yet been formed. First of all, this is due to the incomplete process of transformation of country and regional political systems. Accordingly, on the one hand, the instability of internal political processes, the ambitions of state leaders and the complexity of interstate relations are an obstacle to the integration processes in Central Asia. On the other hand, virtually all regional organizations and integration alliances remain formal and they continue to play only a formal-situational role.

Therefore, in ensuring religious security in the region, preference is given to bilateral relations. For example, as the results of a sociological study have shown, 67% of Kyrgyz respondents prefer bilateral relations. [54] There are countries that try to fight alone with threats to religious security.

Despite this, the significance and capabilities of regional organizations in ensuring religious security in the region are highly rated. For, all actions on religious security on a state scale will not be effective without combining the capabilities of all Central Asian states. Since religious extremism and international terrorism are supranational international forces and can only be counteracted by joint efforts.

Consequently, the formation of an effective regional security system is considered the primary problem of the countries of Central Asia. As the regional foreign policy processes show, the very logic of the dramatic events of recent years has pushed the countries of the region to create an effective system of regional security. In this regard, the Central Asian states require painstaking and long-term work to create an effective regional security system that takes into account world experience in the fight against extremism and terrorism. The security of Central Asia will depend on whether the countries of the region can create such a security system or not. Moreover, the regional security system of Central Asian countries should become an integral part of the global security system, integrating closely with such global security institutions as the UN, OSCE, NATO and others.

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