



RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA (STAGES OF BUILDING RELATIONS)

© 2019, RICA does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of RICA, its staff or its trustees.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from RICA.

**RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA
(STAGES OF BUILDING RELATIONS)**

Contents

Abstract	3
Introduction	4
First stage (1991-1994) – formation of a new territory	8
Second stage (1994-2001) – integration with different tends	16
Third stage (2001-2005) - multi-vector strategy	22
Fourth stage (2005-2014) – evolution of relations	24
Fifth stage (с 2014 года) - «Eurasianism»	28
Conclusion	30
Recommendation	32
Appendix (on Andijan tragedy)	37
Bibliography	40

Abstract

With the ending of confrontation of two superpowers, the transition to a new system of international relations began, which posed complex strategic questions for humanity about the nature of changes in the world and about the dominant factors of power. That power relationship will play a major role in ensuring stability and security in the future. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and a number of other countries weakened the political and economic situation and contributed to the formation of the Eurasian "arc of instability" covering the Balkans, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, and South and Central Asia, where new sovereign states appeared.

After the geopolitical "collapse" of the early 1990s, other cultures rushed into the ideological vacuum in Central Asia. An attempt was made to introduce elements of Atlantic and European civilization here, which caused opposition and aggravated the already-existing problems of the countries of the region during their transitions. The geopolitical status of Central Asia has changed, leading to a clash of interests of world and regional powers. The causes are known - the risks of a global energy crisis (due to the depletion of hydrocarbon reserves) and the failure to search for alternative sources of energy, the growing threat of the spread of extremism and international terrorism, drug trafficking. These global challenges of our time reinforce the interests of the outside world in Central Asia. In a new world, Central Asian states have found themselves in a zone of instability.

Today in Central Asia, a new international political space is formed where Russia and the states of the region determine the spheres of interests, develop foreign policy and national security strategies, and change the system of government. In recent years, Moscow has paid increasing attention not only to cooperation in the field of regional security, but also to integration in the economic sphere.

Introduction

Since ancient times, the world's brightest minds have been trying to determine the possibilities of ensuring a relatively reliable system of national, regional and international security. Throughout history there are countless examples of times when a wrongly chosen geopolitical strategy or wrongly defined development priorities led the country to decline. Most of the worlds' empires collapsed because of inadequate political and military ambitions. The Roman Empire, the superpower of the ancient world, fell because of internal turmoil, economic problems and civil wars. Such a fate likewise befell the Mongolian Empire, which broke up because of internal strife in the struggle for power.

The USSR had the biggest territory in the world and massive amounts of natural resources. In 1970s, it reached military parity with America. The Soviet Union's GDP was about 60% of US GDP (Bratskij sojuz 1982, 21-22). However, the development of the USSR was influenced by a number of negative factors: a costly foreign policy, dependence on oil exports, and the ineffectiveness of the command-administrative planned economy in comparison with the market.

By the end of 1980s, the situation in the Soviet Union was alarmingly unstable, which even the uninitiated population could feel by seeing food disappearing from the stores. In this regard, the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt ironically described the position of the USSR as “Upper Volta with rockets” (Frank 2002, 83).

Askar Akayev, the first president of Kyrgyzstan, stated that the Soviet system, “achieving a significant rise, had exhausted its resources by the 1990s. It lost the competition with the world of democracy and a free economy. It was predisposed to limit the rights and freedoms of the person, to restrain his creative energy. Its foreign policy, due to its extreme ideology, led to the preservation of military confrontation on

international politics, which exhausted the already weak economy of the country” (Akaev 1995, 1). Applying mathematical methods to the study of problems of a centralized planned economy, he came to the conclusion that “planned economy was historically doomed, it moved towards decay” (Akaev 2004, 18).

The same position was held by Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan. He stated, “the economy of the USSR went downhill. We literally choked our economy by increasing the production of weapons, while the technological lag behind the West in other industries was not only obvious - every citizen of the USSR knew about it — but threatening.” (Kazhastanskaja Pravda 2000)

In these difficult conditions, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary at the plenum of the CC CPSU. After he came to power, there were changes in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and normalization of relations with the United States and attempts at rapprochement with the People's Republic of China began. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, which became the apogee of the collapse of the USSR. In December 1989, Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush officially announced that a half-century “Cold War” had ended as a result of the disappearance of military and strategic factors. However, Gorbachev's concept of accelerating socio-economic development did not lead to shifts in the economy but rather to the processes of "democratization and glasnost" ahead of unclear economic reforms. The social and national problems which had accumulated over the decades in the SSRs led individual Republics to seek different ways forward. The Baltic countries separated from the Soviet Union. Belarus and Ukraine were not in favor of the USSR. The leadership of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) stated that Russians were disadvantaged in terms of the proportion of their contribution relative to their share in the state budget of the USSR.

Difficult conflict situations covered the Caucasus and Central Asia. In Tajikistan, a civil war began. In December 1986, the first blood of perestroika was shed in the center of

Almaty, Kazakhstan. Students who gathered in the main square were dissatisfied with the “underestimation of the growing self-consciousness of the people” and were met with fire power. Demonstrators expressed dissatisfaction with the appointment of a quarter-century protégé Gennady Kolbin as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (Kozybaev 1997, 23). The authorities qualified it as manifestation of “terry nationalism”, and as actions of “hooligan youth and parasitic and other antisocial persons” (Izvestija 1986).

In 1988, there were bloody clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh and Sumgait. The threat to the unity of the USSR began to emanate from Russia itself. On the initiative of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin in June 1990, under the specious pretext of the democratization of the Soviet Union, a “Declaration of the sovereignty of Russia” was adopted. That was the beginning of the parade of sovereignties of the republics of Soviet Union. On December 8, 1991, in the suburb of Minsk, in the government residence of Viskuli, the heads of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement stating that “the USSR as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality ceases to exist.” Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were less interested in the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The President of Kazakhstan compared the USSR with a market company that could not stand the competition. He said. “This is a natural death, both for man and for the country. That is - the resource is over. All made the Soviet Union, especially the worst won. But economic, vital resources were not enough. And in a big global competition, the economy and the political state of our big country lost this competition ” (Nazarbayev about the collapse of the USSR).

The end of the Cold War and the global changes coincided with internal socio-economic crises in the Soviet Union, the collapse of which aggravated the crises further. With the end of the Cold War, the destruction of communist system and, especially, after the unexpected and rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union, the international situation radically changed,

and the security conditions in the world have changed. New independent states appeared on the world map. The post-bipolar world entered in an era of dynamic changes.

Evaluating the geopolitical situation and situation in the post-Soviet countries, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1998, 108,149) designated the new place of Russia as the “Black Hole,” and Central Asia as the “Eurasian Balkans”. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (2002, 70) wrote that in the post-Soviet countries, Russian politics under Yeltsin, and even more so under Putin, “tried, with the help of the presence of Russian troops, supporting civil wars or economic pressure, to make the independence of these countries as painful as possible so that the return to the Russian bosom seemed to them a lesser evil”.

In the process of developing a new system of international relations, the countries of Central Asia went through several stages, in the context of which Russia's policy in this region has undergone a number of transformations.

The first stage (1991-1994) - the formation of a new space

This period is characterized by the fact that, for all countries of Central Asia, Russia retained a priority place in their foreign policy strategy. This is due to such objective and subjective reasons as the focus of their economies mainly on Russia, the functioning of the single currency, and security issues. The leaders of the states of the region did not seek separation from the Soviet Union, did not comprehend such a situation, and therefore were not ready for independence and for an independent path of development. Moscow obviously ignored this resource of Central Asian countries, although it could use it to its own advantage to keep them in its orbit in order to unite on a new basis.

In Moscow, certain circles with regard to Central Asia and today adhere to the flawed line "where will they get from us." For example, the well-known Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov, in his article about the return of the Russian Federation to Central Asia, recalling the "great game" of Russia against Great Britain for positions in the region, notes that by joining Central Asia, creating the Turkestan Governor-General, Moscow "received neither resources nor security. Backward feudal regions became eaters first of Russian and then Soviet resources and developed to a large extent at the expense of the central regions of the Russian Empire and later the USSR" (Karaganov 2000). And the Russian political analyst N. Petrov connects the Armenian events of 2018 with Kyrgyzstan, saying, "Armenia is so geopolitically dependent on Russia that one can absolutely not be afraid of a change in its orientation. Events also took place in Kyrgyzstan, which, due to its remoteness, geopolitical dependence and not too great importance of weight and potential in the post-Soviet space, were such that the attention and acuteness of the Kremlin's reaction were also much calmer than in the case of Ukraine or Georgia" (BBC, 2018).

On December 8, 1991, after the agreement of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to create of Commonwealth on a

new basis, the leaders of the Central Asian republics met in Ashgabat. They discussed various options, including the so-called “Turkmen

On December 8, 1991, after the agreement of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to create of Commonwealth on a new basis, the leaders of the Central Asian republics met in Ashgabat.

plan” - not entering into any contractual relations with Russia and other European countries of the former USSR - and ultimately decided to form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Ashgabat meeting itself is noteworthy as a moment of awareness and of the formation of a regional community. The lesson taught by Russia and its Slavic neighbors could not be ignored in Central Asia. The unilateral actions of Moscow, which had already begun in early 1992 to undertake radical economic transformations, had an even greater impact and demonstrated the need to rely on their own measures when solving pressing economic problems. The public in post-Soviet countries was seriously concerned about the current situation in sovereign states, which were becoming increasingly alienated. New relations began to be built on other criteria and principles, when manufacturing enterprises were forced to enter into obviously unequal transactions.

In the early years of independence, as the countries of Central Asia were establishing relations with the United States and Western European countries, their largest companies began to gain a foothold in the markets of the region. The vacuum formed in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union was filled by the countries of the West: the economic presence of China, Turkey, Iran and other countries in Central Asia expanded with those powers' interests and aspirations. World and regional powers were attracted to Central Asia due to its being one of the most energy-rich regions of the world. Analyst Stephan Koch wrote, “recently, this region has attracted increased attention from the Americans. However, for another reason: due to the huge reserves of natural resources of the Caspian Sea. The Americans hope that “black gold” will start

flowing directly to the West through the oil pipelines bypassing Russia. Moscow looks at this problem differently. The competition for power and influence in the region resembles the “Great Game”, which Russia and Great Britain have already played in the region more than a century ago” (Frankfurter Rundschau 2000).

From 1992 to 1995, the US gave millions of dollars of assistance to Central Asian countries: giving Kazakhstan \$523.1 million, Kyrgyzstan \$306.5 million, Tajikistan \$152.4 million, Turkmenistan \$139.8 million and Uzbekistan \$99.5 million dollars. In their article, scholars Birgit Brown and Beata Ashmen conclude, “immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow did not pay much attention to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, because it assumed that the newcomers to world politics would depend politically and economically on Russia in one way or another, and did not even rule out the possibility of alienating from these ruinous and culturally alien partners. Therefore, the concept of the foreign policy of the Russian

The collapse of the Soviet empire also led to the breakdown of the former economic ties between the countries of the socialist community.

Federation of 1992 did not mention any special interests in Central Asia” (Birgit and Jeshment 2002, 115). The collapse of the Soviet

empire also led to the breakdown of the former economic ties between the countries of the socialist community. Some of the main reasons for this were the transition to settlements in hard currency, a change in the principles of economic activity, and the closure of unprofitable enterprises oriented to Soviet markets and standards and not competitive in the external market.

On April 1, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation announced that the protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty is, above all, the business of each state. In 1992, radical economic reforms were launched there, as a result of which all economic ties with the former Soviet republics were finally broken. In fact, Moscow “pushed” the countries of Central Asia from the economic space of Russia, and in 1993 the

Central Bank of the Russian Federation decided to ban the circulation of Soviet rubles on its territory. This led to the need for Central Asian countries to introduce their own currencies. Disintegration ended in 1992 with the collapse of the common economic space, the elimination of the High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the collapse of the ruble zone. The inevitability of such a collapse is confirmed by the example of the Kyrgyz economy. A significant part of its “former economic ties” fell on the military-industrial complex of the USSR (Russia). Moscow constantly asserted about the need to strengthen military-technical cooperation with Bishkek, but for economic (idle plants) and political (doubts about the stability of the partner's geopolitical orientation) reasons, restoring broken ties remains a constantly discussed topic at bilateral meetings.

For the post-Soviet states, the process of disintegration was inevitable. Changes in the world economy, coinciding in time with the beginning of the end of the Cold War, significantly limited the scope of economic and political decisions of states and narrowed the sphere of influence of governments on economic issues. The whole world has adapted to these transformations of international economic relations, including such international financial and economic institutions and organizations as the IMF, WB, IBRD, ECOSOC, FAO, UNCTAD and others. Countries in the post-Soviet transition played a significant role in this transformation, with significant changes in their goals, objectives and principles.

Thus, the continuation of disintegration in the post-Soviet territory to a certain extent was due to the geopolitical orientation of Russia at the initial stage of its sovereignty, proclaimed in June

1990. For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that the Russian Federation's foreign policy was based on Gorbachev's concept of “new political thinking” with an unambiguously pro-Western orientation. Yeltsin, in the struggle for power, gradually became a serious competitor to Gorbachev in the favor of Western countries. He stated that one can learn a lot from the United States, since it is impossible to “just

Thus, the continuation of disintegration in the post-Soviet territory to a certain extent was due to the geopolitical orientation of Russia at the initial stage of its sovereignty, proclaimed in June 1990.

ignore the two hundred years of America's democratic experience.” (Sovetskaja molodezh 1990). His adviser Gennady Burbulis (formerly a teacher of “scientific communism” in Sverdlovsk university), has studied Western development models and confidently stated that without mastering the European experience, it is impossible to solve pressing problems, since “outside of a renewed Europe, Russia's revival is impossible” (Rossijskaja gazeta 1991). At a meeting with the staff of the USSR Foreign Ministry in December 1991, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev noted that henceforth Moscow would pursue a policy of full-blooded partnership and integration with the West (Diplomaticheskij vestnik 1997).

In the West, these initiatives of the leaders of the Russian Federation were carefully considered. Hannes Adomeit, a researcher at the German Institute for International Politics and Security, stated in a report, “until August 1991, the United States and European states were cold about the attempts of the new Russian leadership to establish contacts and ingratiate themselves. However, after the failed August coup, the situation began to change. Yeltsin was increasingly perceived as an alternative to the president of the USSR as a market economy and democracy-oriented one. The collapse of the Soviet Union cemented this process. The West has finally and irrevocably placed a bet on the new Russia, and Russia's Euro-Atlantic orientation has accelerated” (Adomajt 2002, 15). In other words, Yeltsin and Kozyrev proved to be supporters of the idea of an “Euro-Atlantic alliance from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”

However, this did not mean that the West would certainly help Russia overcome the problems that it had accumulated over the decades with its “New Marshall Plan”. After a Soviet economic delegation's trip to the United States in 1991 and meetings with President Bush, as a head of that delegation Primakov stated that “there were no serious talks about economic support for our reforms. In fact, so promising the work of the Soviet-American group in Boston ended in vain. In any case, no one offered us 30 billion dollars (Javlinskij). The group members had different explanations for the failure, but the fact remains” (Primakov 2016, 91).

Even before the collapse of the USSR, the Russian leadership publicly expressed the need to "remove Central Asia from the Russian contentment." "The most right-wing circles believed that if Russia lagged behind, it was only because all the other republics were sucking blood from it. The most infamous was the formula of Solzhenitsyn, who spoke of the need to get rid of "the oppressive burden of the "Central Asian underbelly," as recalled Kyrgyz diplomat Ishenbai Abdurazakov. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan Imanaliev confirmed that democratically and pro-Western-minded people in Russia said that "Central Asia is the burden, the heavy burden that Russia is dragging on itself" (Abdurazakov and Imanaliev 2014, 75).

Even before the collapse of the USSR, the Russian leadership publicly expressed the need to "remove Central Asia from the Russian contentment."

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow advanced the concept of "Russia is part of the West" and made major efforts to integrate its economy with Western countries in order to detach the "Asian freight train" that did not fit into the concept of a "mature partnership" with the USA and Western Europe. In his speech to a meeting of the UN Security Council on January 31, 1992, Boris Yeltsin noted that Russia "considers the US and other Western countries not only as partners, but also as allies" (*Diplomaticheskij vestnik*, 1992, 49). Regarding the territory of the new independent post-Soviet countries, at the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, the official term "neighboring countries" appeared, which had higher political than geographic significance.

However, the hopes of Russian diplomacy for equal strategic cooperation with the United States, the EU, and NATO did not materialize, and the western orientation of Yeltsin and Kozyrev gradually declined. But the main reason for this process was the deplorable results of economic reforms, the results of Gaidar's "shock therapy", which resulted in inflation measured by thousands of percent, prices which jumped hundreds and thousands of times, and theft

and corruption which reached unprecedented levels. Privatization began with the most efficient enterprises that brought great profits to the state.

“The West and its financial organizations have been very active in intervening in implementation of reforms in Russia. Therefore, in the eyes of Russian public opinion, they also carried considerable responsibility for their results. And since they turned out to be deplorable, serious doubts were born about the true intentions of the West - whether it really wants to help Russia or leads other alarming political games,” recalled academic Georgy Arbatov (2009, 136).

In 1992, the Russian elite severely criticized the “romantic” (as they characterized) foreign policy of the country, which, in their opinion, did not correspond to Russia's geopolitical status and, rather, turned it into America's “junior” partner, not its equal. Hannes Adomite rightly notes that “reforms inspired by Western models were not able to slow down the decline of the Russian economy, and led to the impoverishment of society, thus widening the gap between Russia and the West, instead of reducing it” (Adomajt, 19].

The Russian elite came to understand that rapid integra-

The failures and decline of “Euro-Atlanticism” forced Moscow to change the course towards restoring and strengthening political, economic and military cooperation with the CIS states, including with the countries of Central Asia.

tion into Western political and economic structures should not be expected. The failures and decline of “Euro-Atlanticism” forced Moscow to change the course towards restoring and strengthening politi-

cal, economic and military cooperation with the CIS states, including with the countries of Central Asia. In this regard, Moscow began to strengthen the CIS.

Olga Alexandrova, a researcher at the German Institute for International Politics and Security, writes that, “since the summer of 1993, Russia's willingness to more confidently implement its ideas about the CIS and its role in it began to

manifest itself. It was hardly an accident that ethnic conflicts broke out in those former Soviet republics that did not express readiness to join the CIS (Georgia, Azerbaijan) or refused membership (Moldova).

In Georgia, the Russian army supported the Abkhaz separatists. In September-October 1993, Russia put Georgia before a choice: accession to the CIS or death. Georgia joined the CIS, and Russia also received the right to deploy Russian troops on Georgian territory. In July 1993, the democratically elected and pro-Turkish oriented President Elchibey was overthrown in Azerbaijan. Suspicions that this happened with the help of the Russian armed forces were not refuted. Russia wanted to prevent the signing of an agreement on oil production between Azerbaijan and Western firms. Nevertheless, in September 1994, the new President Aliyev signed a treaty, to which Russia reacted very sharply. In 1993 Moldova was also presented with an ultimatum to confirm its membership in the CIS” (Aleksandrova 2002, 119].

The second stage (1994 - 2001) - integration at different rates

By the second half of the 1990s, Russia lost hope for quick integration with the West and, in order to save face, announced a revision of the priorities of the country's foreign policy. In January 1994, the Foreign Ministry announced a turn in Russian foreign policy towards the "near abroad." On February 14, 1995, the Presidential Decree entitled "On the approval of the strategic course of the Russian Federation with the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States" was signed, stating that such a course

The entire territory of the former USSR, including Central Asia, was now declared a "zone of special interests" of Russia.

was in the vital interests of the Russian Federation, and that this was an important factor for Russia's inclusion in world political and economic structures", (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation 1995, 480). The entire territory of the former USSR, including Central Asia, was now declared a "zone of special interests" of Russia.

Despite the collapse of the Western orientation, Andrei Kozyrev, who was the ideological inspiration behind this concept and practical actions, did not resign. Yeltsin did, however, dismiss him from the post of foreign minister at the beginning of 1996, appointing Yevgeny Primakov in his stead. Notably, Yeltsin gave Primakov a *carte blanche* with regards to almost all foreign policy issues. Primakov stated the following as objectives: to correct the "inflection" of Russian foreign policy towards the West, since Russia, having huge interests in Asia, cannot walk on one western "leg"; develop political dialogue and economic ties with the Asian powers; and recognize the inadmissibility of Russia's eastward expansion of NATO.

Russian interests in Central Asia are now concentrated in three areas. The first is in the area of regional security, this is to prevent the influence of outside forces from increasing, including extremist organizations; the second is in the field of energy carriers and hydropower; the third is in the development of integration trends based on the EurAsEC.

In relation to the CIS countries, Moscow departed from the course of reintegration, instead introducing the thesis of "integration at different rates", which corresponded to the real state of affairs. The states participated in the CIS bodies selectively, with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia being the most active. The signing of the Treaty of the Union of Belarus and Russia and the "Treaty of Four" (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia) were described as two major steps towards the formation of the CIS integration core. The experienced statesman Primakov adopted the tactics of establishing bilateral relations and stepping up the activities of the Russian side in such regional associations as the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO).

However, Primakov himself recognized the CIS mechanisms as ineffective or not acting at all. The key role in promoting economic cooperation within the EurAsEC was played by

Kazakh President **The key role in promoting economic cooperation within the EurAsEC was played by Kazakh President Nazarbayev, who tried to convince the Russian leadership of the need to form an economic union. However,**

Boris Yeltsin's entourage was still dominated by the opinion that prevailed in the early 1990s regarding the countries of Central Asia as a ballast, a buffer for Russia. Preference was given to cooperation with Ukraine, but leaders in Kiev sought to establish close economic relations with the European Union, so they quite often resorted to tactics to delay negotiations with Moscow and Astana..

The hopes of the member countries to strengthen economic cooperation in the framework of the customs union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia in 1996 did not materialize. In 1999, Tajikistan joined the Customs Union, after which a five-sided agreement on a customs union and a single economic space was concluded. But the deal remained

most effective on paper: for example, Astana did not abolish the high transit duties it set for transporting Kyrgyz goods (mainly agricultural products) through Kazakhstan. In October 2000, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed an agreement on the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). However, the planned tasks of the organization - the unification of customs tariffs and the creation of a customs union - could not be solved. In 2006, the EurAsEC summit decided to create a customs union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

By this period, the activity of Western countries in Central Asia had a serious influence on the formation of models of economic development and social relations in the region. Leading US oil companies began to raise energy export issues from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and develop pipeline transportation routes. In 1994-1998, the new independent countries of Central Asia, with the support of Western countries, began to create such regional structures as the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), the Central Asian Union (CAC), and the peacekeeping armed structure the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (Centrasbat).

Presidents Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, and Karimov of Uzbekistan signed the “Agreement

Presidents Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, and Karimov of Uzbekistan signed the “Agreement on the creation of a Common Economic Space between the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan” on April 30, 1994 in the city of Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan.

on the creation of a Common Economic Space between the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan” on April 30, 1994 in the city of Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan. Subsequently, a number of fundamental documents were adopted, such as “Appeal to the peoples of the three republics”, “Memorandum on cooperation in the field of migration”, “Agreement on military-technical cooperation” and others. These met the vital interests of the states of the region. In accordance with this, the CAC member countries have assumed obligations for the development of a common transport and communication infrastructure, industrial and other cooperation, the

creation of joint ventures, and the creation of conditions for mutual investment. To ensure the effective functioning of their treaties, appropriate mechanisms were created to facilitate the coordination of executive bodies, including the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministers of Defense and others. In the political sphere, the heads of the CAC at a meeting in Zhambul in December 1995 stated that “by creating a common economic space” they intend to go further along the path of political integration: they intend to create a Central Asian government and even a common parliament.

In the military sphere, the Council of Ministers of Defense was created, which coordinated the actions of the CAC member countries on problems of regional security and on preventing a military threat and danger in Central Asia. An agreement on the organization and formation of a collective peacekeeping battalion under the UN auspices was also signed in Zhambul. The Presidents of the CAC member countries made an appeal to the UN Secretary General with a request to send specialists of this international organization to their countries for consultations, as well as to jointly prepare the necessary documentation for acceding to the UN standby agreement. The decision to form a peacekeeping battalion was made primarily from an analysis of the behavior and experience of the external world (UN and OSCE) to conflict situations, including the civil war in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. In our opinion, regional leaders were slightly wary regarding the position of individual countries prone to solving conflict situations by force.

The Central Asian Union has attracted the attention of politicians and researchers since its inception. In March 1998, Tajikistan acceded to the Treaty on the creation of a single economic space of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan. In August 1996, Russia was admitted to the CAC as an observer, and in June 1999, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine were accepted. In July 1998, by the decision of the Interstate Council of the Central Asian Society, the Union was renamed the Central Asian Economic Community – CAEC. In 2006, at the suggestion of the

Russian side, it “merged” with the EurAsEC. It should be noted that in the editorial article of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” dated March 26, 1997 it was stated that, “CIS: the beginning or the

In July 1998, by the decision of the Interstate Council of the Central Asian Society, the Union was renamed the Central Asian Economic Community – CAEC

end of history? The authors of the report believe that the near abroad is a threat to the security of Russia”. This was followed by a recommendation that, “Russia should concentrate on loosening the developing block (CAC), its split and strengthening of intra-regional rivalry” (Zatulín and Migranyan 1997). Ultimately, the CAC did not take place.

Based on the content of such “documents,” Russia's policy began to be perceived in the Central Asian region as another manifestation of “great power mixed with chauvinism and nationalism” (Karimov 1997, 57). For example, in difficult times for the Kyrgyz economy, Moscow decided to withdraw the Group of border troops of the Russian Federation from the territory of Kyrgyzstan in August, 1998. Against this background, the process of frustration with integration initiatives and treaties within the framework of the CIS intensified, which were then severely tested during the “Batken events” of 1999-2000. These events showed that the principle of transparency of the borders of the CIS and CAC member countries was outdated, that international terrorists, smugglers and drug traffickers had been successfully using this. The regional elite became convinced of the reality of the threat to the security of Central Asia from Afghanistan. Note that during the invasion of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into Kyrgyzstan, the United States provided military-technical support to Bishkek with supplies of special technical equipment including night-vision equipment, radio stations, mining equipment, and others in accordance with the Partnership for Peace with NATO program.

After these events, the countries of the region began to realize themselves as completely sovereign countries, and they began to build up external relations on a bilateral basis, and began negotiations on defining borders and settling water-land issues inherited from the Soviet Union.

In 1996, the PRC, Russia and Central Asia created the “Shanghai Process” mechanism, which led to the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001. In 1997, an agreement was concluded between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition, which led to an end to the civil war in the country.

In 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty (CST), signed on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent. Azerbaijan (dissatisfied with the lack of progress in the Karabakh issue) and Georgia (intolerant of Moscow due to Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatism) also refused to extend their participation in it. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan decided to raise cooperation in the framework of the CST to a new level.

The third stage (2001-2005) - a multi-vector strategy

This period began after the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States. By this time, the countries of the region had determined their own foreign policy priorities and formed a system of their international relations with major world

A turning point for the Western military presence in Central Asia was the creation of an antiterrorist coalition and an operation against the Taliban movement in Afghanistan.

powers. A turning point for the Western military presence in Central Asia was the creation of an antiterrorist coalition and an operation against the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The strengthening of the pro-Western positions in Central Asia was due to the fact that, for some time, the region fell out of the orbit of Russian priorities.

A US military base (in Khanabad) and a base of the Federal Republic of Germany (in Termez) are located in Uzbekistan. Tashkent decided to strengthen relations with Washington, and in March 2002 signed the “Declaration on the Framework for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation”, which states that the US will consider any external threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan with the utmost seriousness.

Tajikistan granted the United States and its allies the right to use Tajik airspace, allowed to be based in Kulyab. In response, Washington lifted the ban on the supply of military equipment to Tajikistan and established a regular political dialogue.

In December 2001, Kyrgyzstan provided the United States and its allies with an airbase at Manas airport, which, after the diplomatic action of Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2009 and the conclusion of a new agreement, was retained by the Americans under the name “Transit Transportation Center”.

Kazakhstan opened its airspace for the passage of the US Air Force, provided railway transit for transportation to American bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. According to some

media reports Astana also offered its territory to house US military bases, but they were told that there was no such need. Turkmenistan likewise agreed to open its airspace for US aircraft and provide an opportunity to transport humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.

Four American bases appeared in Pakistan around this time. American military forces consisting of a contingent 20,000 strong and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with about 11,000 troops under the command of NATO were deployed to Afghanistan.

As a result of the military presence of the United States and NATO, a weighty influence on the regional system of security and stability arose. This complicated the strategic positions of China and Russia. There was a fundamental change in the geopolitical limits, and the formation of a multi-vector foreign policy of the countries of Central Asia began. The Washington administration appreciated the real assistance of the countries of Central Asia in organizing the attack on Kabul and began to take steps to consolidate its presence in the region for a long period. The preconditions for the competition of great powers arose in the region.

The states of Central Asia, as a result of the formation of a multi-layered system of international relations in the region with the participation of players with conflicting interests, are faced with a problem of a multitude of choices.

The fourth stage (2005 - 2014) - the evolution of relationships

Following the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003–2004) and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) a “Tulip Revolution” occurred in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005. A rally outside the presidential administration building ended with his assault.

Russia took a wait-and-see stance, and the presidents of the countries of Central Asia met the news of the "Tulip Revolution" in Bishkek with apprehension.

President Askar Akayev left Kyrgyzstan and, on April 4, he submitted a letter of resignation to the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan. In July 2005, Bakiyev was elected President of the Kyrgyz Republic. Russia took a wait-and-see stance, and the presidents of the countries of Central Asia met the news of the "Tulip Revolution" in Bishkek with apprehension. Kazakhstan closed its border with Kyrgyzstan.

Various “conspiracy theories” about the causes of the “March revolution” in Kyrgyzstan appeared (Martovskaja revoljucija 2005). The opposition to President Akayev did not have foreign sponsors, as evidenced by the fact that this revolution was not driven by the anti-Russian political faction and, after the arrival of the new leadership, there was no reorientation of foreign policy. This must be kept in mind in order to understand the historical foundations of Kyrgyz society.

In foreign policy, President Bakiyev was maneuvering between Russia, China and the West, while prioritizing relations with Moscow. Russian leaders believed that it was high time for Bishkek to resolve the issue of closing the US Air Force base in Bishkek. In Moscow, there was discontent with Bishkek and about the transfer of 48% of the shares of the Dastan enterprise to the Russian side, therefore the allocation of a loan for the construction of the Kambarata hydropower station was delayed.

After Bakiyev came to power, there was no noticeable growth of the economy: raiding and criminalization of business still persisted, and corruption scandals took place. Political persecution intensified and murder took place on this basis. This led to the creation of a new opposition calling for Bakiyev's resignation and the demanding new political reforms including a shift from a presidential system to a parliamentary one.

In April 2010, the authorities' attempts to suppress unrest in Talas ended in failure. The detention of opposition leaders in Bishkek had sparked protests in the capital. The rally participants on the square in front of the administration's assignment were shot down - 87 people were killed, over 1,500 people were injured (Zakljuchenie gosudarstvennoj komissii 2010)

The presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan immediately gave a negative assessment of the “April revolution” and immediately closed their borders with Kyrgyzstan (this lasted for several weeks). China expressed concern about the events and showed its willingness to cooperate with the new government in Bishkek. Moscow reacted with restraint; the Russian leadership spoke about the responsibility of Bakiyev himself for the events in Kyrgyzstan and decided to provide financial and other assistance to the opposition. At the same time, Moscow stressed that full cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Kyrgyz Republic would take place only after the legitimization of power in Bishkek.

On April 14, 2010, the Presidents of the United States, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan discussed the situation in the Kyrgyz Republic during the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and decided to take measures to prevent the escalation of the conflict between the Provisional Government in Bishkek and Bakiyev into a large-scale interregional confrontation. The leaderships of Russia and Kazakhstan ensured the unhindered departure of Bakiyev on April 15, 2010 from Kyrgyzstan and the official filing of his resignation letter.

Andijan events

On May 13, 2005, in the Uzbek city of Andijan, an armed group of activists (according to another version, extremists) seized the city prison and the regional administration building.

On May 13, 2005, in the Uzbek city of Andijan, an armed group of activists (according to another version, extremists) seized the city prison and the regional administration building.

Rallies began. In the evening of the same day, government troops from Tashkent suppressed the attack and took control of the situation. According to official figures, 187 people died (according

to unofficial data, from 750 to 1,500 people). Tashkent accused Kyrgyzstan, alleging that a group of extremists underwent special training on its territory and invaded Uzbekistan. The version of the Uzbek authorities was that, “in August 2004, “religious extremists from the Islamic Movement of Turkestan, Hizb ut-Tahrir and its subsidiary Akramiya planned to seize power in Uzbekistan in order to overthrow the constitutional order. The investigation team has evidence that the territory of the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan was chosen as a base for preparing for the terrorist attacks, where from January to April foreign instructors trained about 70 religious extremists in sabotage and terrorist methods. More than 60 trained and armed militants from among the citizens of Kyrgyzstan, having taken border guards hostage, invaded the territory of Uzbekistan and took an active part in the terrorist attacks on the night of May 13” (Moldaliev 2008, 289).

In the assessments of the Andijan tragedy, the “double standards” of the great powers are evident. Moscow and Beijing not only supported Tashkent's position, but also suggested where the threat came from and what should be done. Central Asian countries (except Kyrgyzstan) expressed solidarity with the official Tashkent position. The Russian foreign minister first turned the arrows on to the Afghan Taliban, then told about the presence of the “Chechen trace”. Tashkent was forced to declare that there was no information regarding the Taliban's involvement.

In June 2005, during Uzbek President Karimov's visit to Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that, “we confirm the information that the infiltration of militants from Afghanistan from specially prepared bases took place, and their concentration in adjacent territories was a fact. We informed our colleagues from those countries where they were concentrated, but we do not know how much information was brought to you” (Kyrgyzinfo 2005; Amin 2005).

Kyrgyzstan once again (after the invasion of the IMU in 1999 and 2000) became a victim of the internal policy of its neighbor and found itself in a difficult situation. Tashkent demanded the

Kyrgyzstan once again (after the invasion of the IMU in 1999 and 2000) became a victim of the internal policy of its neighbor and found itself in a difficult situation

return of the Andijan refugees, and international organizations urged Bishkek to comply with international obligations (Briefing Crisis Group 2005). On May 23, 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic sent a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan in which it reported that rumors of weapons and militants involved in external forces, including the Taliban, had not been confirmed in the Andijan region. On June 6, 2005, the President of Chechnya declared that he "does not see the Chechen trace in the events in Uzbekistan." He demanded that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs present concrete evidence of the involvement of the Chechens (Moskovskij komsomolec 2005).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan demanded explanations and the presentation of any concrete evidence of its involvement. None was found, and Russian politicians had to abandon such sensational statements. Afghanistan has ever since officially denied the accusations of Russia. President Hamid Karzai said that the government would not allow the use of Afghan territory as a base for terrorist activities in other countries, he expressed the hope that Moscow will stop spreading false information (Amin, 2005). Tashkent, in 2006, restored its membership in the CST.

Fifth stage (since 2014) - “Eurasianism”

Russia has repeatedly proclaimed its foreign policy course as the “European choice of Russia”. In 2006, President Putin wrote, “this choice was largely set by the national history of Russia. In spirit, culture, our country is an integral part of European civilization. Today, building a sovereign democratic state, we fully share the basic values and principles that make up the world outlook of most Europeans. We consider European integration as an objective process, which is an integral part of the emerging world order. The development of multifaceted ties with the EU is the fundamental choice of Russia” (Konoplev 2009).

According to academician Alexey Arbatov, “few critics of the current philosophy and policy of “Eurasianism”, conservatism and national romanticism could more clearly and convincingly express the idea of a European choice than Vladimir Putin himself” (Arbatov 2014). However, the US and its allies in the North Atlantic bloc, despite Moscow's warnings, decided in the mid-1990s on the first wave of NATO expansion to the East, which Russia took with great regret. Relations between Russia and the West cooled even more following the divergence of positions on the Kosovo issue.

Moscow took a firm course to implement the strategy of a “multipolar world”, the essence of which was to counteract the

In this light, mass protest actions in Russia in 2012–2013 were regarded by the Kremlin as attempts by the West to inspire a “color revolution”

sole leadership of the United States of America. In this light, mass protest actions in Russia in 2012–2013 were regarded by the Kremlin as attempts by the West

to inspire a “color revolution”. Moscow came to the conclusion that further “rapprochement” with the US and the EU was not only unpromising, but also dangerous, and therefore changed the “European choice” to the doctrine of “Eurasianism.” According to this concept, Russia intends to promote integration with Belarus, Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states.

In the CIS space, Moscow's foreign policy today solves numerous tactical tasks. The Eurasian Economic Union remains useful, its trade and economic achievements are still hardly visible, but the situation is evolving. The institutions of the Commonwealth of Independent States, except the Collective Security Treaty Organization, are gradually receding into the background.

Moscow is now paying more attention to the development of bilateral relations with Central Asian countries,

regarding the actions of the US and the EU in the region as a threat to its interests and as intentional attempts to eliminate Russian influence in the new independent

Moscow is now paying more attention to the development of bilateral relations with Central Asian countries, regarding the actions of the US and the EU in the region as a threat to its interests and as intentional attempts to eliminate Russian influence in the new independent countries of the region

countries of the region. The Kremlin is now more worried about US initiatives than those of the EU. For example, Russia was alarmed by the creation by Washington of the C 5 + 1 platform for cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. But this does not mean that Russia fully approves of EU policies in the region either - EU support for the civilian sector, democratization processes and human rights observance, independent media and human rights defenders is likewise concerning. Kremlin experts view all of this involvement as outside powers laying the groundwork for "color revolutions" in Central Asia.

Conclusion

One must admit that the development of the situation in the CIS largely depends on the position of Russia, especially in the military-political sphere. The situation in Afghanistan and the events in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the 1990s created ideal conditions for strengthening Moscow's presence in Central Asia. At the initial stage, Russia missed its opportunity to use the collective framework of the CIS to create an internal counterweight to Russian policy. At first, it was assumed that all decisions in the CIS should be taken by consensus, that is, each state had the right of veto. Now the CIS member countries are deprived of this opportunity, since the practice of selective participation of states in agreements has taken root, which allows each state to not consider the opinion of individual other states opposing a decision.

The position of Moscow, in turn, has always been determined under the influence of external and internal factors. Possessing military potential comparable to US strategic capabilities inherited from the superpower of the USSR, Russia claimed to maintain the status of "superpower" and lead in the international arena. However, in the conditions of the new world, the strategic offensive weapons (START) of the Russian Federation could not be transformed into a factor of influence in world politics without corresponding economic power.

As for the Commonwealth of Independent States, the policy of strengthening bilateral "vertical" ties moved the bulk of the "bargaining" between Russia and other states to the plane of bilateral relations, weakening the possibility of submitting controversial issues for collective discussion in the Commonwealth. This quite suits some countries in the CIS. Even in the case of joint efforts of member countries in the institutions of the Commonwealth, an increase in the role and influence of Russian ministries and departments dooms such attempts to certain failure.

Today, none of the centers of gravity can claim a dominant position in Central Asia. Until now, none of the external forces have consolidated here, but it is necessary to note the importance for the region of support (both material and moral) of Western countries as an external stabilization factor. At the same time, Russia, unlike other powers, except for interests in Central Asia, bears a certain historical responsibility for the fate of the countries of the region. It has a huge resource here that no other external state possesses: the pro-Russian mood of almost all social strata of the population of Central Asia.

Of course, there may be positive or negative assessments of Moscow's policy in the region, but the regional elite in the majority do not deny the role of the Russian language and Russian culture for familiarizing the peoples of Central Asia with world culture. Russia must realize that the countries of Central Asia, both large and small, do not want to be in alliance with those states that want to decide for them what is possible and what is not. Responding to skeptics, one can say that responsible foreign policy for the countries of Central Asia and Russia is just beginning. The point is behind the clearly defined strategy of Moscow in the new geopolitical conditions.

Recommendations

Despite the fact that the process of rigid ideological confrontation between the West and the East has come to naught, many small states that emerged after the Cold War and weak nations feel the geopolitical pressure and aggression of regional and world powers. We can see here echoes of Napoleon's expression that "the big battalions are always right." All post-Soviet countries still live partly in yesterday's world, guided by the concepts of the "Great Game" of the 19th century, partly in the future with the new-fangled theories of tripolarity, multipolarity, and Eurasianism. Political myths about the "world government", the "Judeo-Masonic conspiracy", and "controlled chaos" continue to prevail. In this regard, the independent states of Central Asia should take into account the following points:

1. Globalization is an objective process that makes our world more interconnected and interdependent; it not only contributes to the expansion of space for political action, the integration of countries, and the strengthening of the economy and the improvement of social structures, but also becomes one of the serious challenges to security policy. Based on this, the parameters of national geopolitics should be derived from the position that a large conflict potential lies in the increasing gap between groups of rich and poor countries. It should be borne in mind that these "schisms" are becoming even wider, that the chasm is increasing even faster than before.

2. It is important to keep in mind that in new conditions national and regional security problems often turn into global ones. This suggests that security is increasingly influenced by global factors from which it is impossible to isolate national borders.

3. On the issue of the prospects of small and large countries of the world, philosophers also turned to old turning points. Jawaharlal Nehru said that size is the most unreliable criterion

of the greatness of a person or a country. It is impossible not to support the opinion of the Nobel Prize laureate Friedrich Hayek that "we would all win if we managed to create a world in which small countries felt good."

4. It is required to realize that the geopolitics of oil and gas, coupled with pipeline competition, can lead international relations to harmony, but to the same extent can cause fierce rivalry and even conflict.

5. There are many ambitious projects for the construction of international roads, pipelines, power lines and other infrastructure, but for now these are only plans. In addition, there is the danger of being marginalized by globalization, isolated from the rest of the world. In this regard, the states of the Central Asian region should pay more attention to regional trade, as well as economic relations with Western countries, Turkey, China and India.

The regional elite must clearly understand the contemporary challenges to security and stability in Central Asia, which can be divided into three categories. The first category of challenges has a transnational character; these include religious extremism, international terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking.

The second category of challenges includes the "influence" or "pressure" of large countries on the states of the region. "The vast energy resources and strategic location near the western border of China have led Beijing to see Central Asia as a *dingwei*, or "vital space." China needs territory, Russia wants to control this space, and the Western powers want a guarantee that this region will not be monopolized by Moscow and Beijing. The countries of the region are influenced by large states, and this situation creates tension and even hostility here. At the same time, the Central Asian states themselves are actively joining various security and international development organizations, which eliminates competition between them and promotes their rapprochement.

The third category includes the struggles within ethnic groups, which comes from the need to redistribute the resources of influence within the ethnic group in terms of the acquisition of sovereignty. These conditions also gave rise to the possibility of redistributing resources of influence among representatives of the titular nation, which gave rise to conflict between elites.

Russia and the countries of Central Asia should deeply embrace the concept of asymmetric interdependence in regionalization. The world will be stable only when it is based on the principles of justice.

Appendix

The Andijan tragedy

After I. Karimov returned to Tashkent from Andijan on the evening of May 13, a telephone conversation took place with the President of Russia. On May 14, 2005, at a conference briefing the foreign press on the Andijan events the President of Uzbekistan said that “the troops are so efficient at the borders that a cat or dog will not run. We did not pursue anyone and specifically let them go so that innocent civilians would not be injured in the shootings” (Karimov 2005). No one asked the question of how then religious extremists “trained in Kyrgyzstan” penetrated into Uzbekistan and reached Andijan.

On May 15, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told the press that “the events in Uzbekistan are a provocative action of criminal groups like the Taliban (Dubnov 2005). Then, in Vladivostok, he told journalists about the presence of the “Chechen trace” in the Andijan events. There was an indignant reaction from the leadership of Chechnya. “After this unexpected statement, top officials of Russia began to avoid public references to the “Chechen trace”, meaningfully hinting that they know a lot about the presence of certain foreign mercenaries in Kyrgyzstan, but unfortunately they could not tell about this more specifically for reasons of state security . For observers, these hints only caused a grin,” said expert A. Volosevich (2005). Journalist Dubnov (2005) wrote, “however, if you still remember what the main Russian diplomat said about the events in Andijan, even then there was a lot of bewilderment, first of all, from a logical point of view.” Claiming that “indisputably, all this was begun with the participation of the Taliban,” Mr. Lavrov added after this that “it will be important for our common struggle against terrorism, if it is confirmed that among them were the Taliban”. So the question of whether the Taliban were in Andijan or not remains in the air.

The first deputy foreign minister of Russia, Valery Loshchinin, spoke more frankly on the Mayak radio station on

May 15, 2005. He stated, “the complex socio-economic situation, a certain weakness of power, the Islamic factor, all taken together, taking into account the population's dissatisfaction with their standard of living, also predetermines the explosiveness of the situation” (Rossijskij MVD 2005).

Speaking at a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels on June 9th, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said, “we have enough reliable information: everything that happened in Andijan was inspired from the territory of Afghanistan. A group of armed militants of Islamist organizations, including the Taliban, have long been preparing an invasion of Uzbekistan. Therefore, in the course of investigating all the circumstances of the incident, it is necessary to answer, first of all, the questions: who organized the riots and how and with whose help? In the final analysis, this is about curbing the threat of international terrorism in this extremely strategically important region” (Gordienko 2005).

Immediately after the events, the National News Agency of Uzbekistan spread information from the Uzbek Prosecutor General's Office (in the *Pravda Vostoka* government newspaper) that in Teke, at an abandoned training ground in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan, from January to April 2005, foreign instructors trained about 70 religious extremists in sabotage and terrorist skills. At the same time, it was specifically indicated that the training and training of “acromists” was led by a certain Chechen named Mamed (Azattyk 2005). The Minister of Defense of Kyrgyzstan Isakov answered this by saying, “this training center is under constant guard of the troops. The statement that there could hold their teachings (extremists) is simply ridiculous” (Kim and Gruzдов 2005). He suggested that the Uzbek authorities were trying to find a source of Andijan events on Kyrgyz side of the border in order to save themselves from responsibility.

Hypothetically, the Taliban fighters, “leaking out” from Afghanistan, could equally as well have “concentrated” in Turkmenistan or Tajikistan, but Kyrgyzstan's candidacy was suitable for the role of an external source of Andijan events in

many ways: the IMU invasion (1999-2000) was carried out through Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan, and on March 24, 2005, the Tulip Revolution took place in Bishkek, accompanied by riots. The leaders of the CIS countries in those events were looking for an “American footprint” aimed at democratizing Central Asia. Apparently, for this reason, the Russian defense minister at NATO headquarters “made a nod toward Kyrgyzstan”. He stated, “democracy in general cannot be a subject of export and is approved only as a result of the internal self-development of this or that nation. And the task of the international community is not to impose one's ideas, but to provide all possible assistance in the formation of democratic institutions” (Gordienko 2005).

The controversial statements of Russia and Uzbekistan about the defeat (or rebirth) of terrorism in Afghanistan were most likely associated with the challenges of democratization and orientation against the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia. However, the accusations themselves made in connection with the events in Andijan, as well as the resolution of the SCO summit on the withdrawal of US military bases from the region, cast doubt on the strength not only of the antiterrorist aspirations of the countries of the world.

Bibliography

1. Abdurazakov I. and M. Imanaliev Neokonchennyj dialog (Unfinished dialogue). Bishkek, 2014.
2. Adomajt, Hannes. Konceptual'nye napravlenija vneshnej politiki Rossii/ Vneshnjaja politika Rossii: ot El'cina k Putinu (Conceptual directions of Russian foreign policy / Russian foreign policy: from Yeltsin to Putin). Kiev: Optima, 2002.
3. Akaev, Askar. Dumaja o budushhem s optimizmom. Razmyshlenija o vneshnej politike i miroustrojstve (Thinking about the future with optimism. Reflections on foreign policy and world order). Moskow: Mezhdunar. otnoshenija, 2004.
4. Akaev, Askar. S narodom i dlja naroda (With the people and for the people). Bishkek. 1995.
5. Aleksandrova, O. Trudnaja restavracija staroj zavisimosti. Politika Rossii v otnoshenii SNG/ Vneshnjaja politika Rossii: ot El'cina k Putinu (Difficult restoration of old addiction. Russian policy towards the CIS / Russian foreign policy: from Yeltsin to Putin). Kiev: Optima, 2002.
6. Alma-Ata. 1986g. Dekabr'. Kniga-hronika. Alma-Ata, 1991.
7. Adomajt, Hannes. Ukaz.soch.
8. Amin, Tarzi, "Afganistan: nesoobraznosti v vojne s terrorizmom (Afghanistan: inconsistencies in the war on terror)." Radio Svoboda. July 20, 2005.
Amin, Tarzi. Ukaz. soch. Radio Svoboda
9. Arbatov, G.A. Delo: «Jastreby i golubi holodnoj vojny» (Case: "Hawks and Pigeons of the Cold War"). Moskow: Algoritm Jeksmo, 2009.
10. Arbatov, A.G. Krushenie miroporjadka? Rossija v global'noj politike. (The collapse of the world order? // Russia in global politics) September 3, 2014.
11. BBC, "Armenii devat'sja nekuda»: pochemu Kreml' tak spoken", April 12, 2018.
12. Belov, A. "Tashkent v "pomoshhnikah" ne nuzhdaetsja" (Tashkent does not need "help"). Vesti.uz. May 19, 2005.

13. Birgit, Braujer and Beate Jeshment. Politika Rossii v Central'noj Azii/Vneshnjaja politika Rossii: ot El'cina k Putinu (Russian policy in Central Asia / Russian foreign policy: from Yeltsin to Putin). Kiev: Optima, 2002.
14. Bratskij sojuz svobodnyh respublik. Sojuz nerushimyj: Spravochnik (Indestructible Union: a Handbook). Moskow: Politizdat, 1982.
15. Briefing Crisis Group, "Uzbekistan: vosstanie v Andizhane".
16. Brifing Krajsis Grup N 38 Azija, May 5, 2005.
17. Brzeziński, Z. Velikaja shahmatnaja doska. Gospodstvo Ameriki i ego goestrategicheskie imperativy (Great chess-board. America's dominance and its strategic imperatives). Moskow: Mezhdunar. otnoshenija, 1998.
18. Diplomaticeskij vestnik, 1997.
19. Diplomaticeskij vestnik, 1992. 4/5.
20. Dubnov, A. "Andizhan razdora. Rossija riskuet possorit'sja s Zapadom iz-za Uzbekistana" (Andijan discord. Russia risks quarreling with the West over Uzbekistan). Vremja novostej. N102. July 10, 2005.
- Dubnov, A. "Andizhanskoe poboishhe. Vosstanie podavleno s besprecedentnoj zhestokost'ju." (Andijan massacre. Uprising crushed with unprecedented cruelty). Vremja novostej, N°83. May 16, 2005.
21. Frank, Umbah. Rossija i rasshirenie NATO na Vostok – integracija, kooperacija ili izoljacija?/ Vneshnjaja politika Rossii: ot El'cina k Putinu (Russia and the expansion of NATO to the East - integration, cooperation or isolation? / Russian foreign policy: from Yeltsin to Putin). Kiev: Optima, 2002.
22. Frankfurter Rundschau. May 29, 2000.
23. G.Javlinskij ubezhdal Primakova E. o tom, chto v SShA vyrabatyvajutsja mery jekonomicheskoj pomoshhi SSSR v razmere ne menee \$ 30 mlrd (G. Yavlinsky convinced Primakov E. that measures for economic assistance to the USSR in the amount of at least \$ 30 billion were being worked out in the United States.).
24. Gordienko, A. "Mjatezh v Andizhane byl inspirirovan s

territorii Afganistana, zajavil Ivanov” (Mutiny in Andijan was inspired from the territory of Afghanistan, said Ivanov).

Izvestija. June 9, 2005.

25. Gordienko, A. “Ivanov zakryl andizhanskij vopros” (Ivanov closed the Andijan question). Nezavisimaja gazeta N 116 (3512). June 10, 2005.

26. I was in the middle of a storm - Nazarbayev about the collapse of the USSR. Available at:

https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/ya-byil-v-tsentre-shtorma-nazarbaev-o-razvale-sssr-307083/

27. Izvestija. “Soobshhenie iz Alma-Aty” Izvestija (TASS). December 18, 1986.

28. Karaganov, S., “Central'naja Azija: vozvrashhenie Rossii”, Rossijskaja gazeta. December 12, 2000.

29. Karimov, I. "Nikto ne smozhet svernut' nas s izbrannogo puti" (No one can turn us off the chosen path) (Press-conference text). UzA. May 16, 2005.

29. Karimov, I.A. Uzbekistan na poroge XXI veka: ugrozy bezopasnosti, uslovija i garantii progressa (Uzbekistan on the threshold of the 21st century: security threats, conditions and guarantees of progress). Moskow: Drofa, 1997.

30. Kazahstanskaja pravda. 6 April 2000

31. Kim A., and Gruzdov Ju., «Teke» — ne poligon dlja terroristov” (Teke is not a training ground for terrorists), Available at: www.msn.kg/ru/news/11238/

32. Kissindzher, G. Nuzhna li Amerike vneshnjaja politika? (Does America need foreign policy?). Moskow, 2002.

33. Konoplev, R., “Evropejskij vektor Rossii – signal k peremenam dlja pridnestrovskih jelit.” (European vector of Russia - a signal for change for Transnistrian elites) Evrazija. March 15, 2009.

34. Kozybaev, M. Dekabr' 1986 : fakty i razmyshlenija (December 1986: Facts and Reflections). Almaty, 1997.

35. Kyrgyzinfo. 29 June, 2005.

36. Lavrov zajavil o prichastnosti chechenskih terroristov k sobytijam v Uzbekistane (Lavrov declared the involvement of Chechen terrorists in the events in Uzbekistan). Interfaks, June 2, 2005.

37. Martovskaja revoljucija v Kyrgyzstane: shag vpered ili...//otv. red. Moldaliev O.A. (March revolution in Kyrgyzstan: a step forward or ... // ed. ed. Moldaliev OA)/ Bishkek: Bijiktik, 2005.
38. MID RF besporjadki v Uzbekistane vyzvany slabost'ju vlasti (Russian Foreign Ministry called the causes of the riots in Andijan)
<https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=63682&tid=27968>
39. Moldaliev O.A. Islam i politika: politizacija Islama ili islamizacija politiki? (Islam and Politics: Politicization of Islam or Islamization of Politics) Bishkek: 2008. (Look at Appendix)
40. Moskovskij komsomolec № 1668 June 7, 2005
41. Primakov, E.M. Vstrechi na perekrestkah (Meetings at the crossroads). Moskow, 2016.
42. Rossijskaja gazeta, "Obnovlennaja Rossija i obnovlennaja Evropa. K poezdke B.N. El'cina vo Franciju", Rossijskaja gazeta. April 20, 1991.
43. Rossijskij MID nazval prichiny besporjadkov v Andizhane (Russian Foreign Ministry called the causes of the riots in Andijan). Lenta.ru. May 14, 2005.
44. Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossijskoj Federacii, N49. S.480 (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation). Moskow, 1995.
45. Sovetskaja molodezh', June 3, 1990.
46. "Uzbeckskaia prokuratura zajavljaet, chto organizatory andizhanskih sobytij proshli podgotovku v Kyrgyzstane" (Uzbek prosecutor's office says organizers of Andijan events trained in Kyrgyzstan). Novosti radio azattyk (kg). September 6, 2005.
47. Volosevich, A. "Chechenskij sled v andizhanskih sobytijah ischez tak zhe vnezapno, kak pojavilsja"(The Chechen trace in the Andijan events disappeared as suddenly as it appeared). Fergana.ru. October 17, 2005.
48. Zakljuchenie gosudarstvennoj komissii dlja vsestoronnego izuchenija prichin i uslovij, a takzhe dachi politicheskoj ocenki tragicheskimi sobytijami, proizoshedshimi v aprele i mae 2010 goda (The conclusion of the state com-

mission for a comprehensive study of the causes and conditions, as well as giving a political assessment of the tragic events of April and May 2010). Bishkek: Bijiktik, 2010.

49. Zatulin, K and A. Migranyan, SNG: nachalo ili konec istorii? /Novye nezavisimye gosudarstva Srednej Azii: "ugroza s juga" – vyzov I otvet"(CIS: the beginning or end of the story? / Newly Independent States of Central Asia: "Threat from the South" - Challenge and Response). Nezavisimaja gazeta, N54(1379). March 26, 1997.



Moldaliev Orozbek Abdysalamovich

PhD on Political Science. National Coordinator of Association
of Experts of Central Asia.
Founder of "SEDEP" research institute.
Professor of Ala-Too International University and Kyrgyz
National University.

**REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF CENTRAL ASIA (RICA) ACCEPTS
MATERIALS FOR ITS MONTHLY REPORTS AND QUARTERLY
JOURNALS ON REGULAR BASIS.**

**For more information please contact
Public Affairs Coordinator Toktobek Omokeev**

E-mail: t.omokeev@rica.network

Tel.: +996 (312) 88 22 01

Webpage: www.rica.network

What
we do:



Social issues



Politics and security



Economy



IT and innovations

B/C «Maximum+»
st.Turusbekova 109/3,720001
Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic
Tel.: +996 (312) 882 201
e-mail: rica.network@gmail.com
Website: www.rica.network